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THE EFFECT OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS ON
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Randall S. Thomas* and Kennethj. Martin"
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, the stratospheric increases in Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) pay levels have made executive compensation a popular
target for shareholder activism, particularly when high pay is accompa-
nied by poor corporate performance. Outraged investors have made
their views known to corporate boards of directors using shareholder
proposals, binding bylaw amendments, 'Just Vote No" campaigns, and
other activist efforts. As institutional and other shareholders have
attempted to monitor board decisions, the question remains: Have their
efforts been successful in influencing executive compensation?
To date, little empirical research has been conducted on this question.
In this paper, we examine each of the various methods by which
shareholders have tried to influence executive compensation. We then
attempt to determine whether one of the most popular methods for
individual investors-shareholder proposals using Rule 14a-8-has had
any impact on the level and composition of CEO's compensation at
target companies. We use data for the 1993-1997 proxy seasons on 168
executive compensation proposals submitted to 145 different companies
to determine how shareholders have chosen their target companies and
whether these companies' boards have responded to investors' proposals
by reducing CEO pay levels or by shifting the composition of their pay
packages.
Our analysis yields several interesting results. We find that sharehold-
ers generally target their proposals at relatively poorly performing
companies exhibiting higher levels of executive compensation than other
similarly-sized firms in their industry. This is consistent with the claim
that shareholder proposals are being used in an attempt to monitor
excessive levels of executive compensation.
* Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Iowa.
** Professor of Finance, College of Business and Economics, New Mexico State University.
The authors would like to thankJames D. Cox, Deborah A. DeMott, Charles M. Elson, Paul
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Shareholder support for executive compensation proposals is not as
high as with most other types of shareholder proposals. However,
shareholders statistically are more likely to support executive compensa-
tion proposals that attempt to restrict executive compensation than they
are proposals that simply ask for more disclosure about executive
compensation. Similarly, shareholders are statistically more likely to
support executive compensation proposals that raise corporate gover-
nance issues rather than those that raise social responsibility issues.
Shareholder proposals concerning executive compensation may affect
the level and composition of CEO compensation. When we compare
CEO compensation levels at firms receiving shareholder proposals with
pay levels at similarly-sized firms in the same industry that did not
receive shareholder proposals, we find that target companies do not
increase average total CEO compensation levels as rapidly in the year
after receiving a shareholder proposal (on average two percent increases)
as firms not receiving such proposals (on average 22.3% increases).
Figure 1 shows this comparison for each of the most important pay
components and for total compensation.'
This change reduces the gap between the CEO pay levels at target
companies and CEO pay levels at similarly-sized firms in their industry
in the year after receipt of a shareholder proposal. However, although
the dollar amount of these decreases is very substantial-over $800,000
when the total compensation packages are compared-these changes
are not statistically significant. Furthermore, we find that the composi-
tion of CEO compensation at target companies shifts toward more cash,
and less long term incentive compensation, in the year after the receipt
of the proposal, although this change is not statistically significant.
Finally, we employ regression analysis to determine whether executive
compensation levels at companies receiving shareholder proposals are
affected by a variety of factors related to the proposal. The factors we
examine include the level of voting support for the initiative, the type of
sponsor of the proposal, and the nature of the proposal. We find some
support for the hypothesis that higher levels of voting support for
proposals are associated with smaller increases in CEO compensation
at companies receiving proposals when compared to CEO pay levels at
similarly-sized companies in the same industry. We further find that
proposals to restrict executive pay have a similar effect. These results
1. Figure 1 shows the percentage changes in the various compensation components and total
compensation from the year in which the shareholder proposal on executive compensation was made to
the year after the proposal was made. It reports these figures for both the sample firms and a matched
industry comparison group.
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are consistent with the hypothesis that boards of directors are responsive
to shareholders' expressions of dissatisfaction with their firms' executive
compensation pay packages, especially when they are raised as
corporate governance issues.!
This paper begins with a brief discussion of the current trends in
executive compensation. Part II outlines the rapid rise in managerial
compensation in recent years. It breaks out the different components of
executive pay and examines each one separately. In Part III, we ask
whether shareholders should attempt to monitor executive compensa-
tion. Initially, we focus on shareholder monitoring's role in the
principal-agent model of the firm. We then we look at the limitations
on shareholders' capacity to monitor executive compensation and the
possibility that labor shareholders could be effective monitors of
managerial pay.
Part IV examines the constraints on shareholders' ability to influence
executive compensation. After a brief discussion of the collective action
problems shareholders face when initiating voting campaigns, we
concisely outline two recent changes in the federal securities laws, the
1992 proxy rule amendments and the 1992 executive compensation
disclosure requirements, that have facilitated shareholder action on
these issues. In Part V, we detail the different ways in which sharehold-
ers convey their views about executive compensation to their companies'
boards of directors. The five different approaches we look at are:
informal pressure; precatory shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8;
binding bylaw amendments; voting on company proposals to create
stock option plans; and 'Just Vote No" campaigns. We follow this
discussion with a brief survey of the empirical literature related to
shareholder proposals in Part VI.
In the last section of the paper, we present our empirical analysis and
results. We begin with a description of our data, including a discussion
of the different types of proposals submitted by shareholder groups. We
then analyze the CEO compensation structures of the firms receiving
shareholder proposals and contrast them to a comparably-sized group
of companies within their industry. In subsection C, we then turn to the
differences in corporate performance between firms receiving proposals
and similarly-sized firms in their industry. Finally, we present our
regression results concerning the effect of shareholder proposals on
CEO compensation levels.
2. The type of sponsor is also generally significant with proposals submitted by organizations
leading to lower relative pay levels. The other variable included in the regression is insignificant.
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II. THE MECHANICS OF ExEcuTwE COMPENSATION
CEO pay has increased dramatically over the past ten years to reach
levels unprecedented in the post-World War II era. In 1997, for
example, median total compensation for CEO's was valued by a Wall
StreetJournal survey at $3,093,018.' This represented a 29.2% increase
over 1996 compensation levels. Nor is this a one year blip. Using 1993-
1997 data to look at the longer term trend, the same basic pattern
emerges: CEO pay is up 2 64 % over that four year period.4
Until recently, most institutional (and other) shareholders were
relatively sanguine about this trend, deferring to boards' arguments that
companies needed to be competitive in an increasingly tough manage-
rial labor market and that incentive-based pay would produce improved
corporate performance.' As compensation committees continued to
award CEOs mega-grants of stock options, the incentive compensation
component of executive pay plans soared.6
This explosion in incentive pay led some shareholders to question the
wisdom of pay-for-performance compensation plans and to ask
corporate boards to justify their decisions to award top executives so
much money, particularly when some of these CEOs have not produced
increases in the company's stock prices. These investors generally
cannot, however, bring about changes directly. Rather, as we discuss
more fully below, they must persuade their companies' boards of
directors to take action.
A. The Process of Determining Executive Compensation
7
The board of directors of the corporation is charged with the
responsibility of determining the level and composition of executive
3. See 77,eBoxs's Pay, WALL ST.J., Apr. 9, 1998, at R13.
4. See Adam Bryant, Exwasi Cash Maddm" HozvA PIab/e ,rystan IiJa Pay L ds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 1998, § 3, at 1.
5. SeeJames E. Heard, Exeuw Cwipesatim. Pfspectim oft& Instiiona/ Investor, 63 U. CIN. L REV.
749, 749 (1995).
6. Economists claim that strong managerial pay-for-performance incentives lead to significant
improvements in firm performance. Se Kevin Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS (Orley Ashenfleter & David Card eds., 1999) (surveying the empirical literature); PAUL
MILGROM &JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT ch. 13 (1992) (surveying
empirical literature). Existing empirical evidence shows that executive pay is responsive to firm performance
and that increasing managerial incentives leads to improved firm performance. It is less clear that current
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels provide the appropriate performance incentives and more
importantly, if any performance improvements that may result are cost-justified from the firm's
shareholders' perspective.
7. For a more detailed summary of the process used by compensation committees in determining
executive compensation, see GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991).
1999] 1025
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compensation within the firm. At most corporations, the board of
directors delegates the job of investigating and determining the
appropriate levels of executive pay to the compensation committee.'
This committee frequently would be comprised exclusively of non-
employee directors,9 many of whom would be current or retired execu-
tives from other public companies, and none of whom would spend
much time on the committee's work."0
The company's human resources department normally will start the
process by submitting a proposed executive pay package to the
compensation committee. The compensation committee will consider
this proposal and determine if it is appropriate or needs modification.
These directors will usually rely on the information provided by the
company and operate in a reactive mode, responding to the human
resources department's proposals."
To assist the compensation committee in performing its task, it
generally retains a compensation consultant. 2 Most of these experts
8. S e Randall S. Thomas, Puttig a Lid on Ewuuiv Conpsat.. Economics' 7heoies Lawyers' Critiques
and the Problem of Internal Pay Difffrmtia&s (Mar. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors);
Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 6, at 24; Crystal, supra note 7, at 214.
9. SeIJAME D. COX ETAL, CORPORATIONS § 11.6, at 234 (1997) ("[I]ncreasingly compensation
committees are composed exclusively of outside directors and are given the authority to establish
compensation policies and particular packages for senior executives.").
10. See CRYSTAL, supnra note 7, at 214. "A board compensation committee typically consists of about
five outside directors-directors who are not employees of the company and who, at least theoretically,
have no economic ties with the company. The committee meets several times a year, sometimes every time
there is a board meeting." Id.
11. SaJames D. Cox, 77wALI, IJns onabatin and Disclosum- 77 Questfor the Outside Director's Spine,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1233, 1237 (1993) ("Outside directors spend most of their time reacting to
management's strategic planning and reviewing other corporate policies and practices, to an extent that
allows only infrequent explicit and formal review of management's performance."); Murphy, supra note
6, at 24 ("Compensation committees, which typically meet only six to eight times a year, lack both the time
and expertise to be involved in the minutia of pay design.").
12. Crystal states that companies routinely hire compensation consultants to advise the company
about top executives' pay. CRYSTAL, spra note 7, at 42-50. Murphy claims that compensation committees
"rarely" retain their own compensation consultant, but rather rely on the company's human resource
department for initial recommendations for pay levels and new incentive plans. See Murphy, supra note 6,
at 24.
Crystal criticizes most compensation consultants for their lack of independence from the
company's CEO. He argues that these consultants are retained by the company to perform a wide variety
of other services and are therefore unlikely to risk jeopardizing their entire business relationship with an
adverse recommendation concerning the CEO's pay. See CRYSTAL, supra note 7, at 219-20.
Prudent directors would be well-advised to take Crystal's suggestion to heart. The Delaware
courts have stressed the importance of professional advisors' independence and competence. See Kahn v.
Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 426-30 (Del. 1997). Although it is difficult for shareholders to succeed in
a derivative action challenging a board's decisions about executive compensation, good corporate practice
would dictate attempting to follow the courts' guidelines. Furthermore, this is an area in which the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has indicated significant interest and may mandate additional
disclosures. The SEC could well decide that shareholders should be informed about all financial
relationships between the compensation consultant and the corporation.
HeinOnline  -- 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1026 1998-1999
CORPORATE LAW SYMPOSIUM
come from a handful of well-known consulting firms specializing in
executive compensation matters, many of which provide a wide variety
of other consulting services to the company.' The compensation
consultant will perform a variety of tasks for the committee.
The committee usually asks the compensation expert to compile
information about the pay scales of executives at other comparable com-
panies. 4 Much of this information is publicly available through proxy
statements compiled on electronic medium. 5 Based upon this data, the
consultant will prepare a report to the committee comparing the com-
pensation of executives at comparable companies with this company's
executives' pay.'6 The report will detail where within the industry-wide
remuneration spectrum the company's executives' pay falls.
The compensation committee will determine what executive pay
package to endorse after considering this information, and whatever
other information it decides is relevant. After completing its work, the
compensation committee will prepare a report and recommendation to
the entire board. 7 The board normally approves such recommenda-
tions as a routine matter without much inquiry.
Shareholders have no direct input in this process. They can voice
their opinions to the board of directors in a variety of ways before and
after the package is approved, but this only indirectly affects the
outcome of the process. Investors may also indirectly influence the
shaping of executive compensation programs because boards know that
shareholders must normally approve the stock option plans that are
13. See CRYSTAL, supra note 7, at 218-20.
Most executive compensation consultants are employed by firms that do more than
executive compensation consulting. .... Indeed, in many cases, the revenues derived from
a given client for such work as actuarial consulting dwarf by several orders of magnitude the
revenues for executive compensation consulting. So, bucking a CEO and telling him that
he ought to cut his bloated pay package can potentially cost a consulting firm not only the
loss of executive compensation revenues but the loss of much larger revenues being
generated from other services.
Id. at 219.
14. See id at 220 ("Companies are solicited to complete often voluminous questionnaires on the
types of compensation plans they use, how the plans work, and how much executives earn from them.
These data are then analyzed statistically, and reports are sent back to participating companies."); Murphy,
supra note 6, at 9 (pay surveys are universally used in setting executive compensation).
15. One example is a service called Executive Compensation Plan Documents CD-ROM sold by
Bowne Publishing. In 1998, this service included over 4,000 executive compensation plans from SEC
filings, over 2,000 proxy statements for virtually all of the Fortune 1000 over the previous two years, and
the ability to search these files by industry name, Standard Industrial Category, geographic location, and
keywords relating to type of compensation.
16. &e CRYSTAL, rupa note 7, at 45.
17. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 24. The compensation committee must disclose its report to the
company's shareholders under SEC regulations. See Part III.B infa for further discussion of the executive
compensation disclosure requirements.
1999] 1027
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often part of executive pay packages. Boards may thus feel compelled
to take shareholders' views into consideration to insure passage of any
proposed stock option plan. However, shareholders do not otherwise
usually vote on executive compensation packages.
B. The Components of Executive Compensation
To understand total CEO compensation, we must first examine each
of its components. Executive compensation can be usefully divided into
several different categories:' 8 salary 9 and bonuses,20 which are relatively
fixed; and stock option grants,21 and all other long term remuneration
18. S&o Murphy, supra note 6, at 5. In addition to receiving salaries, bonuses and long-term forms
of compensation, executives have access to a wide range of perquisites, such as company airplanes and
apartments, special dining rooms and washrooms, and country club memberships. Companies also provide
executives with a variety of fringe benefits, including health, dental and medical insurance, life and
disability insurance, and company cars. In some cases, the value of these benefits can reach millions of
dollars. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 39,157, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2038 (Sept. 30,
1997) (SEC criticizing independent directors and company for failing to disclose perquisites awarded to a
retiring CEO valued at $3.6 million).
Executives also generally will participate in company-wide and supplemental executive
retirement plans (SERPs). SERPs may be a very significant source of income for managers, but they are
not included in the pay figures discussed in the text. The value of SERPs is not publicly disclosed, and they
have been characterized as "stealth compensation" with potentially enormous value. See Murphy, supra
note 6, at 23-24.
19. Although salary has been a declining percentage of executive compensation, top managers feel
it is very important because it is a key guaranteed component of their employment contract and many of
the other components of executive pay are tied to the level of the executive's salary. See Murphy, supra note
6, at 9-10. For example, target bonuses are usually expressed as a percentage of base salary. See id.
20. Murphy describes the typical bonus plan as follows:
Under the typical plan, no bonus is paid until a threshold performance (usually expressed
as a percentage of the performance standard) is achieved, and a "minimum bonus" (usually
expressed as a percentage of the target bonus) is paid at the threshold performance. Target
bonuses are paid for achieving the performance standard, and there is typically a "cap" on
bonuses paid (again expressed as a percentage or multiple of the target bonus).
It. at 10-11.
21.
A stock option gives an executive the right, but not the obligation, to purchase a fixed
number of shares of company common stock at a fixed price over a fixed term of years. In
almost all cases, the purchase price, generally called the strike price, is the market price per
share of the stock on the date of the grant.... The period of time during which the option
may be exercised is virtually always ten years in duration. Generally, the option may not
be fully exercised during the early years of its ten-year term (typically a period of around
four years from the grant date); but thereafter, the executive is free to choose the date of
exercise.
CRYSTAL, supra note 7, at 63. See also Murphy, supra note 6, at 16 ("[M]ost options expire in ten years and
are granted with exercise prices equal to the 'fair market value' on date of the grant.").
About two-thirds of the companies in major market indices offer their executives interest-free loans to
finance their purchase of the company's stock. See Danielle Sessa & Laura Saunders Egodigwe, Inconie
Plans Can Fuel Insider Buying, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 13, 1999, at Cl.
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plans, whose value varies more widely from year to year.22 Today,
salaries and bonuses are the smaller component of executive pay.
Median salaries and bonuses for top executives at 350 of America's
largest companies were $1,596,667 in 1997, an increase of 11.7% from
the previous year.
23
Salaries and bonuses have risen sharply over the last two decades. In
a recent study of executive compensation 21 using data from 1980 to
1994, average executive salary and bonuses were found to have
increased by ninety-seven percent over that fifteen year period in real
inflation-adjusted terms. Average executive salary and bonuses rose
from $655,000 in 1980 to $1,300,000 in 1994 in real 1994 dollars.25
The value of stock option grants over the same time period increased
much more dramatically.26 In 1997, a Wall StreetJournal survey found
that the median gain for corporate leaders exercising stock options was
$1,868,268. Looking at historical data, the average value of stock
option grants went from $155,000 in 1980 to $1,200,000 in 1994, for an
increase of 6 8 3 % in real inflation adjusted terms. 28 The percentage of
CEO's holding stock options increased from thirty percent to almost
seventy percent over the same time period.
In addition to stock options, there are a panoply of other forms of
long-term compensation plans. Restricted stock is a very popular form
of long-term incentive compensation.29  Restricted stock is company
stock that is given to, or sold at a deep discount to, a corporate executive
subject to the limitation that it cannot be sold during a fixed period of
31time. Usually the restriction lasts for five years, although there areinstances in which the restriction will continue until the executive's
22. There are other forms of executive compensation that can be important in certain
circumstances. These include signing bonuses for executives that are being recruited to the firm from
outside (and rarely to employees already with the firm), and golden parachutes, which are large severance
packages paid out to top executives in change of control transactions.
23. See The Boss's Pay, supra note 3, atRI.
24. See BrianJ. Hall &Jeffrey B. Uebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, at 12-13 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6213, 1997).
25. See id at 12-13. These averages conceal large variations within industries. Se Murphy, supra
note 6, at 5. For example, executives in the electric utilities cam substantially less than those in financial
services companies.
26. Reported values for stock options and other long term compensation are highly variable
because, even though their value may result from several years' performance, the reported gain is realized
all in one year. See MILWROM & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 424-25.
27. See The Boss's Pay, supra note 3, at R12.
28. See Hall & Uebman, supra note 24, at 13.
29. See CRYSTAL, supra note 7, kat 71. In 1996, roughly 28% of companies in the S&P 500 granted
restricted stock to their executives. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 23. These grants accounted for 22% of the
compensation of the executives that received grants. See id
30. Other restrictions can also be imposed on the resale of the stock. For example, the executive
may not be able to sell the shares until certain profit goals are realized, or until her retirement.
1999] 1029
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retirement.3 Typically the executive pays nothing for these shares.
Some of the other tykes of long-term executive compensation systems
include: bonus units;P2 equity units;33 long term management incentive
plans;3 , tax protected restricted stock;35 phantom stock;36 and stock
appreciation rights.37 These long-term incentive pay plans have become
much more popular in recent years with many companies using three
or four different schemes to compensate their top executives.
III. SHOULD SHAREHOLDERS MONITOR ExEcUTIVE
COMPENSATION?
The principal-agent model of the corporation recognizes that in the
modem public corporation, the shareholders who hold ownership rights
(the principals) are separate from the managers that run the business (the
agents). This separation of ownership and control creates the potential
from divergences between the interests of managers and shareholders.
On the one hand, shareholders want firms to maximize profits and
delegate broad discretion to managers to act in their best interests to do
so. Managers, on the other hand, will run the company in a self-
interested manner to maximize their own utility.3" This may lead
managers to diverge from the shareholders' preferred goal of maximiz-
31. &e CRYSTAL, supra note 7, at 71. However, if the executive quits before the limitation period
is up, or is fired forjust cause, then she forfeits the stock. See id. at 72.
32. Bonus units give the recipient the right to receive a cash payment equal to the difference
between the strike price ofthe unit (sometimes less than the market price ofthe company's stock at the time
ofissue) and the actual market price of the stock at the time of the exercise of the bonus unit. The holder
is also entitled to receive dividends up until the time of exercise as if she held the actual shares. See id at
67.
33. Equity units entitle the holder to purchase company stock at its book value in a particular year,
then to resell the stock to the company at their future book value in a later year. See id. at 73. The holder
also gets the dividend payments made on the stock while she holds it.
34. In these plans, the payout to the executive is based on the company's performance exceeding
a specified level. For instance, a measure of performance such as a 15% rate of growth of earnings per
share over a three year time period was used in one well-known executive's pay package. Se idL at 74-75.
About 27% of the CEOs at S&P 500 companies received these payouts in 1996. See Murphy, supra note
6, at 23. These amounts constituted 20% of these executives' pay. See id
35. These grants ofrestricted stock come with the additional feature that the company agrees to pay
any additional taxes that the executive would have to pay when she sells the stocL So CRYSTAL, supam note
7, at 152.
36. These are units that act like common stock but which do not constitute claims for ownership
of the company. Phantom stock entitles the executive to receive the increase associated with common stock
prices and any dividend payments that are declared payable to the common stock.
37. Stock appreciation rights (SARs) are the right to receive the increase in the value of a specified
number ofshares ofcommon stock over a defined period of time. This enables the executive to realize the
benefits of a stock option plan without having to purchase the stock.
38. Manager's utility will be increased by higher consumption of things that they individually value,
such as power, happiness, and monetary rewards.
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ing profits. For instance, managers may "shirk" from working as hard
as they could in order to enjoy more leisure, or they may "shark" by
diverting valuable resources to themselves.39
The principal tries to limit the extent of these divergences by giving
the agent appropriate incentives' and by expending resources to
monitor the agent's conduct to curtail deviations.' The agent may also
expend bonding costs to guarantee that she will not undertake certain
actions to harm the principal's interests or agree to compensate the
principal if she does.42 Any remaining divergences between the agent's
actual performance, and the actions that the agent should have taken to
maximize the principal's interests, are designated as residual losses.43
The sum of the monitoring costs, the bonding expenditures, and any
residual losses, are defined as agency costs."
Several different markets constrain agency costs, including labor
markets, the market for corporate control, capital markets, and product
markets. These markets interact with one another. For example, if a
firm's labor costs rise too high, then it becomes uncompetitive in the
product market, raising its cost of capital and making it a potential
target in the market for corporate control. However, these market
39. Agents are assumed to be acting in their own self-interest in this model. Although there
undoubtedly is some truth in this observation, this assumption has been criticized on a number of grounds,
including that agents may like to work, and that it is an unduly pessimistic view of people's nature. Se Eric
W. Orts, Shirking and Shrking: A Lqal Thn of t/u Fm, 16 YALE L & POL'Y REV. 265, 277 (1998)
(summarizing these critiques).
40. For example, the conflict between managers and shareholders interests can be mitigated through
the use of incentive compensation packages which align the incentives of managers with those of
shareholders. Stock options can be used to provide managers with an equity interest in the corporation.
As executives' level of stock ownership increases, they will bear a greater percentage of the costs of any
deviations from the standard of profit maximization. In this situation, self-interest will lead managers to
act in shareholders' best interests.
However, as noted below, managers should not be given too high a level of stock ownership or
they may become permanently entrenched in office, thereby interfering with the market for corporate
control and shareholder voting rights.
41. "The principa can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for
the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent." Michael
C.Jensen & William H. Meckiing, 7hey ofte Fm.. ManageaBaavio Agerc Casts and Ownership Stucture,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). Some examples of these monitoring expenditures include outside
directors, "auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions and the establishment of incentive
compensation systems.. ." Id.
42. See id at 308. Thus, the principal and agent may agree to share the risks and rewards of the
business to encourage the agent to act in the principal's best interest. Se Orts, supra note 39, at 276. For
example, an officer may agree to base his or her salary on the firm's performance.
43. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 41, at 308. In other words, a certain level of misconduct is
inevitable and is too costly to prevent.
44. See id at 308. Principal-agent relationships are valuable when the agency costs associated with
them are less than the economic gains that they make possible plus any net gains achieved from monitoring
and bonding. Se Orts, supra note 39, at 276.
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constraints are often loose ones, leaving significant scope for divergences
between manager and shareholder interests."
Corporate governance institutions may also act to minimize agency
costs. For example, the board of directors can be thought of as a device
for mitigating the agency cost problem. The board acts to monitor
managers to insure that they maximize shareholder value.46 Outside
directors can be effective in controlling managerial self-dealing and
overreaching.47 Empirical studies have also shown that the likelihood
that a board will terminate a poorly performing top executive increases
as the proportion of outside directors on the board increases.48
Economists have argued that the board may better attack agency
costs through the appropriate design of incentive compensation pack-
ages to motivate management to act in shareholders' best interests.49
Incentive plans tie managerial pay to a measure of firm performance.
An optimally designed compensation package would perfectly align the
interests of shareholders and managers so that managers would make
business decisions designed to maximize shareholder value.
50
Shareholders can also act as monitors of executive compensation.
Although they delegate substantial authority to the board of directors,
they exercise ultimate control over the board and its agents through
annual elections. They also have the right to vote on most stock option
plans that are proposed by the board of directors. However, sharehold-
ers should not attempt to dictate how the corporation conducts its day-
to-day business, or otherwise engage in micromanaging the corporate
enterprise.
There are significant obstacles in shareholders' path to becoming
effective monitors. We focus on two particular problems in the
remainder of this section and the next: first, shareholders' capability to
45. Sw StewartJ. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Coorate C S /anthl&rAsct rm
by Labor Unimu, 96 MICH. L REV. 1018, 1083-84 (1998).
46. Proponents ofthe agency cost model view the board as serving its monitoring function best when
it focuses solely on shareholder interests and not the broader set of interests of all participants of the firm.
&eid at 1088.
47. &e Cox, jupra note 11, at 1242. By contrast, boards are less effective in improving corporate
performance and controlling illegal conduct by corporate managers. See id. at 1239-42 (summarizing
studies).
48. Se id. at 1241.
49. Sm Hall & Liebman, szpm note 24, at 3. Agency costs also could be reduced through board or
shareholder monitoring of the CEO, but this may be difficult and costly. See id. at 3-4.
50. &e id at 4. Performance-based compensation, such as the use of stock options, or securities
whose value tracks corporate performance, is designed to give managers incentives to maximize share price
and may reduce managers' aversion to undertaking risky projects with high returns that shareholders might
want the firm to engage in. For further discussion of the theoretical justifications for incentive pay, see
generally Thomas, jrpra note 8.
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act as monitors of executive compensation; and second, shareholders'
ability to influence executive compensation.
A. Shareholders Have Limited Capacity to Monitor
Shareholders are not by and large well-equipped to act as monitors
of executive compensation. Compensation plans are complex, technical
documents that cannot be readily understood without a substantial
amount of knowledge about the intricacies of different types of pay
programs. Even directors on the compensation committee, with access
to expert consultants and all of the facts surrounding these plans, may
have difficulty understanding them. Shareholders cannot expect to have
the same level of access to information and often will have to work
without the benefit of expert help.
If shareholders have a sufficient level of expertise (or expert assistance)
to understand how current compensation plans work, they will also need
to be able to determine whether the current plan is the right plan for
their company and its executives. To make this determination,
shareholders would need to know what other alternative compensation
packages could be put in place. Again this would require monitoring
shareholders to have some level of expertise, or to retain a compensation
expert.
Diversified shareholders that seek to monitor the wide variety of
companies in their portfolio face more difficult problems. Each
industrial sector has its own unique competitive challenges. As a result,
different industries use executive compensation packages exhibiting a
wide variety of components. Even within an industry, the individual
companies will have executive compensation plans tailored to their
particular situation. This makes it more difficult and expensive for
investors to monitor executive compensation, as they will need to
evaluate these plans on a case-by-case basis.5 For all of these reasons,
shareholders should not attempt to engage in micromanaging corporate
executive compensation decisions, but rather only seek to detect
particular abuses of the pay process.
When shareholder voting is required, such as with stock option plans,
shareholders will need to look at each plan in order to determine how
to vote on it. Each plan's complexities and differences will make it
difficult for shareholders with large portfolios, such as pension funds,
and other institutional investors, to adopt simple voting guidelines for
5 1. Ste Charles M. Yablon, Ovfcompesatin: 77Te Corporae Lawyer and Ekeanim Pay, 92 COLUM. L
REV. 1867, 1892 (1992).
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their portfolio managers.52 Instead, in order to engage in effective
monitoring, their portfolio managers would need to undertake time
consuming research about individual plans before deciding how to
vote.53
Shareholders may not be good monitors of executive pay for other
reasons, too. The benefits from monitoring executive compensation
decisions at any particular company will be relatively small for most
large investors. Even if they are successful in shaving a few million
dollars from one executive's pay package, this will have only a minus-
cule impact on the company's bottom line and the value of their
investment. The indirect benefits may be greater: other employees may
feel less resentful of "unfair" executive compensation or the CEO may
be motivated to work harder in the future.54 The costs to the share-
holder may be significant, though, as the CEO is likely to harbor some
ill will toward them for a long time.55
For this cost-benefit analysis to weigh in favor of taking action, either
the shareholder must be able to benefit from changes at a wide variety
of companies, perhaps by reducing pay across the industry or industries,
or the initiatives must have low costs, such as when the bad feelings
generated toward the shareholder make little difference to her. This
latter point may explain why many institutional shareholders prefer to
work informally and privately to influence executive compensation,
56
52. CalPERS has stated that "[s]hareholder proposals on executive compensation need to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis upon due consideration of the economic and financial circumstances of
the targeted company and the language ofthe proposal." CalPERSDometk Phuy Votfi Guiddng (visited
Apr. 1I1 1999) <http://www.calpers-govemance.org/principles/domestic/voting/pagel l.asp>
[hereinafter Ca/PERS.
By contrast, institutional investors have been able to adopt easily-applied voting guidelines about
many other corporate governance issues,'such as anti-takeover defenses. In part because of this difference,
shareholder support for these types ofcorporate governance proposals has been substantially higher than
it has been for executive compensation proposals. Soa Randall S. Thomas & KennethJ. Martin, Swz Labor
Be AlloedtoMa S oadoldrPoposals, 73 WASH. L REV. 41, 76 tbl.3 (1998).
The absence of easily applicable voting policies will also make it more difficult for any
shareholder to obtain strong voting support for proposals concerning executive compensation levels or
composition.
53. Alternatively, shareholders could delegate these decisions to third parties or seek expert advice
on how to vote their proxies. Sa RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW AND EiNHORN
ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORpORATE CONTROL §§ 8.01-.04 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing how these services
work).
54. See Thomas, supra note 8; Yablon, supra note 51, at 1893.
55. Sm Thomas, umz note 8.
56. Professor Yablon notes that institutional investors also may suffer from agency problems because
their executives may be unwilling to attack high compensation levels at other companies for fear that their
own compensation will come under attack. S. Yablon, supra note 5 1, at 1893.
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whereas individual shareholders are more willing to use the shareholder
proposal mechanism to try to influence boards.57
Monitoring may be unattractive for some shareholders for other
reasons. Many shareholders, such as mutual funds, care about the
liquidity of their investments and their short term performance. They
are unwilling to invest substantial resources in bringing about corporate
governance changes that have uncertain immediate returns and may
create substantial ill will from management. 8 Even public pension
funds, frequently, the most active and informed of the institutional
investors, may be too busy satisfying their primary responsibilities to
their beneficiaries to be active monitors of executive compensation
reform.5 9
Despite all of these problems, investor monitoring of executive pay
practices is occurring. At one end of the spectrum, some shareholder
voting advisory services, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),
use extremely sophisticated techniques.6 0 ISS has advanced computer
models that it uses to evaluate corporate executive pay packages as part
of determining how to advise its institutional investor clients about how
to cast their votes on stock option plans. ISS makes these models
available to companies (for a fee) so that the companies can evaluate
their pay plans before submitting them for shareholder approval.6
Individual investors appear to use much simpler techniques in their
monitoring efforts. These investors seem to focus on cruder measures
of executive pay and its relation to corporate performance in detecting
abnormalities in individual companies' pay practices.62 They may also
rely on the popular presses' coverage of particular pay practices as a
57. See a/w id at 1895 (shareholder "gadfly" groups may be important force in challenging executive
compensation because they do not need to maintain cordial relationships with management and have little
financial stake in any one company).
58. Sor idat 1893.
59. Joshua A. Kreinberg, Reacdng Beyond Paefonnana Cmpenation in AtUmpts to Own Me Corporame
Exvuotim, 45 DuKE LJ. 138, 168 (1995); Yablon, supra note 5 1, at 1890-92 (discussing the ineffectiveness
of shareholder solutions and the reasons for reluctance on the part of investors to challenge compensation
decisions).
60. Graef Crystal also prepares analyses of different companies executive pay packages for various
organizations and the general public. See eg., Graf Crystal, Council of Institutional Investors, 1997
Executive Pay Anti-Hroesa (Oct. 5, 1998); Graef Crystal, TVe CVsW Arpoa OsEw (visited Apr. 18, 1999),
<http://www.crystareport.com>.
61. We applaud this innovative program and believe that it could develop into a new form of
shareholder monitoring that could be more effective than any existing approaches. In essence, ISS is
getting companies to change their stock option plan proposals in a manner that addresses shareholder
concerns as a way of getting a favorable vote recommendation. If ISS's model accurately reflects
shareholders' concerns about what are appropriate executive pay practices, this process has the potential
to improve compensation programs and shareholder-management relationships.
62. See infra Part VII.C-D (discussing our data concerning which companies individual shareholders
target using Rule 14a-8).
1999] 1035
HeinOnline  -- 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1035 1998-1999
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LA WREVIEW [Vol.67
method for determining which companies to target.6' Although these
are clearly inexact measures of whether a corporation's executive
compensation practices are out of whack, they do have a strong intuitive
appeal and may correlate well with the more sophisticated measures.64
However, shareholders need to develop better and more widely
accepted techniques of determining what are appropriate pay levels and
compensation systems if they wish to improve as corporate monitors.
B. Labor Shareholders As Monitors
Labor shareholders may be exceptionally good monitors of executive
pay.65 Many labor groups hold large amounts of corporate equities and
have similar interests to other shareholders in monitoring executive
compensation.6 Labor shareholders, and in particular labor unions,
may have a comparative advantage over other shareholders in acting as
a monitor of corporate executive compensation plans.6 ' At first blush,
this seems implausible. Unions will only have access to the same public
information regarding executive compensation that is available to
shareholders. However, unions are relatively more experienced in
compensation issues, are more involved in the company on a day-to-day
basis, and have significant obligations at the bargaining table. All of
these factors should give labor groups a greater understanding than most
shareholders about the processes used to determine executive pay levels
and the implications of different pay packages for corporate perfor-
mance.
Unions understand the workings of compensation incentives, or
disincentives, incorporated in most executive compensation packages.68
This knowledge of compensation mechanisms makes unions better
equipped to unravel the intricacies of public information about
executive compensation packages and reach conclusions about its
meaning. Their expertise also makes them aware that several important
63. Sm Marilyn F.Johnson & Margaret B. Shackell, Investor Use offEhanded Proy Statement Dicioirurs
on Exvecutiw Compensation (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (finding that individual
shareholders use negative press coverage as a means of determining which companies to target with
shareholder proposals).
64. However, unless other shareholders believe that such measures are the correct ones to apply,
they may be uncertain about how to vote on such proposals. This may partially explain the low favorable
voting percentages for such initiatives that arc discussed infta Part VII.B.
65. By labor shareholders, we are referring to labor unions, union pension funds, individual union
members, and union-oriented pension funds. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 52, at 41 n. 1.
66. For a general discussion of labor's shareholder activism, see Schwab & Thomas, supra note 45.
67. Seeid at 1086.
68. Sid
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compensation systems are not disclosed in the materials that companies
provide to their shareholders.69
Labor has used a variety of different approaches to generate public
support for reforming current executive pay practices. Unions have
publicized egregious examples of high executive pay to the public
through the use of an Internet web site called Executive PayWatch. °
This web site allows anyone to examine the compensation packages of
corporate executives of 417 firms, and to compare them to their own
salaries. Executive PayWatch provides further information to share-
holders and other members of the public on how to decipher executive
pay disclosures on proxy statements, and how to vote their proxies and
use the shareholder-proposal mechanism to push companies to change
their practices.'
Although labor has some advantages in monitoring executive pay, it
will need to focus on evaluating different types of pay-for-performance
systems, rather than worrying about how pay is determined at any
particular company. By taking this approach, labor groups can best use
their limited resources to have an impact on a wider range of compa-
nies.72 Furthermore, it'labor wants to obtain other shareholders' support
for reducing executive compensation levels across the board, it will need
to dispel the notion that it is seeking to attack management for its own
selfish reasons.73 In particular, labor will need to demonstrate to other
shareholders that the executive compensation plans it challenges have,
or will, negatively affect shareholder value.74 If labor can succeed in
demonstrating this to the satisfaction of other shareholders, then it can
be optimistic about their willingness to support its initiatives.7"
69. See, e.g., supra note 18 (discussing SERPs, the details ofwhich are not publicly disclosed under
current SEC rules and regulations).
70. &SExecutiwPayWatch (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http://www.aflcio.org/paywatch>.
71. Seeid
72. S&e Ronald J. Gilson, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance; An Academic
Perspective, 792 PLI/CORP. 647, 677-78 (1992).
73. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 45, at 1082-83.
74. Labor needs to avoid presenting executive compensation solely as an issue of fairess to workers,
thereby reflecting the adversarial side of labor-management relations. However, labor groups could make
relative pay an effective shareholder issue by tying it to firm value. Empirical research in the business and
psychology fields has found that high pay differentials between corporate CEO's and lower level managers
and employees negatively affects the value of the firm. See Thomas, supra note 8, for a summary of these
studies. Thus, boards should consider that overpaying corporate executives in comparison to their
coworkers will reduce shareholder value. For a further discussion of this point, see id.
75. Thomas and Martin found that other shareholders generally vote for labor shareholder
proposals at roughly the same rate as they do for public institutional shareholders' proposals, and at a
greater rate than for other sponsor types. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 52, at 44.
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IV. SHAREHOLDERS' ABILTY TO INFLUENCE ExEcuTIVE
COMPENSATION
To the extent that shareholders are willing and capable of engaging
in useful monitoring of executive compensation practices, they must do
so through indirect methods. Shareholders do not have the right, and
are not generally offered the opportunity, to approve or disapprove of
compensation practices, with the exception of stock option and
employee stock purchase plans.1
6
Coordinated shareholder action on matters such as executive
compensation is hard to achieve successfully." Widely dispersed
shareholders face significant collective action barriers, including the high
costs and limited rewards of individual action. Although shareholders
can "vote with their feet," and sell their stock when they disapprove of
the company's compensation practices, this option is unavailable for
indexed investors, and unattractive for other investors whose diversifica-
tion strategies would be harmed by such a sales. Of course, large
investors, such as some institutional holders, may be able to influence
corporate executive compensation policies through the use of proxy
fights, shareholder resolutions, and coordinated action.78
A. The 1992 Proxy Rule Amendments
The Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) 1992 proxy rule
amendments have facilitated shareholder communications by reducing
76. See Yablon, supra note 5 1, at 1892 n.69. Even these exceptions can be circumvented in some
cases though, by employing devices such as repurchased share plans and replenishment plans. Sea Richard
H. Wagner & Catherine G. Wagner, Recnt Delopmnts in E ts*, Director, and Fnp/oye Stock Compnsation
Plans: Nav Conctan For Corporate Di?tors, 3 STAN.J.L BUS. & FIN. 5, 16-18 (1997) (noting that these types
of plans have no dilutive effect and therefore do not require shareholder approval). See also infa notes 158-
68 (discussing recent changes that the stock exchanges have made to their rules requiring shareholder
approval of stock option plans).
77. SeeCox, supranote 11, at 1236.
Even in an era of significant concentration of ownership in the hands of a few financial
institutions, the shareholders' records on such matters as cancelling poison pills, initiating
antigreenmail proposals, and reining in executive compensation are reason to question their
ability regularly to discharge a monitoring task except in situations in which management's
ineptitude brings the firm to the brink of disaster.
Id.
78. Se Kreinberg, supra note 59, at 166-67; see also LindaJ. Barris, 77w Overconpmsati n Probkm. A
ColletfiwApp achto Contwlling Ercule Pay, 68 IND. Lj. 59,96 (1992) ("Some institutional shareholders have
found their power to influence corporate governance has reached a level where companies are willing to
negotiate changes to avoid a messy proxy battle.").
1038
HeinOnline  -- 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1038 1998-1999
CORPORATE IA W SYMPOSIUM
the regulatory barriers to, and costs of, collective shareholder action.7 9
These new rules make it easier for shareholders to communicate with
each other informally without having to comply with the federal proxy
rules filing requirements for most matters. These changes have been
very helpful to institutional and other shareholders that seek to engage
in active monitoring of corporate management.8"
One of the most significant amendments to the proxy rules created a
qualified exemption for communications relating to an incipient or
ongoing solicitation with or among shareholders who are not seeking
proxy authority, and who do not otherwise have a substantial interest in
the outcome of the regulated solicitation that differs from that of the
shareholder.8 ' This change has greatly facilitated shareholder opposi-
tion to management proposals, such as stock option plans.
Another key amendment allows shareholders to publish their voting
positions in print or broadcast media without governmental inter-
ference. 2 This change has enabled CalPERS to create a new website
in order to, among other things, broadcast its votes and voting policies.8 3
Some commentators are predicting that this website will greatly enhance
CalPERS' ability to influence voting on shareholder compensation
issues.
84
The 1992 changes removed some obstacles to collective shareholder
action, thereby facilitating shareholders' expression of opposition to
management proposals, or support for other shareholders' corporate
governance initiatives. These revisions also changed the proxy rules
governing non-exempt solicitations to reduce the costs and delays
associated with proxy filing and SEC staff review requirements.85
These rule changes have enabled shareholders to engage in proxy
contests against management compensation policies at a significantly
reduced cost.86 One recent empirical study found that the passage of the
79. For a complete discussion of the scope of the 1992 proxy rule amendments, see THOMAS &
DIXON, supra note 53, at §§ 5.01-.03.
80. See Heard, supra note 5, at 754.
81. Seeidat 754; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(l) (1995). Shareholders are required to send copies of
written communications to the SEC, although press releases, public speeches and public statements
disseminated to the media are exempt from the filing requirement.
82. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 53, at §§ 5.01-.03; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(I)(2)(iv) (1995).
These communications cannot, however, request proxy voting authority.
83. The address is <http://www.calpers-govemance.org>. On the site, CaIPERS discloses its
domestic proxy voting guidelines, among other things. These guidelines include a section on executive
compensation with subsections on stock option repricing, shareholder proposals, long term incentive plans,
and a variety of other compensation related issues.
84. Patrick S. McGum, CaLPERS Unveis N'a Governanc Web Page, ISSUE ALERT (Feb. 1999), at 5.
85. See THOMAS &DIXON, supra note 53, § 5.
86. See Heard, supra note 5, at 760.
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1992 amendments also increased the percentage of favorable votes for
shareholder proposals.8 7 Several institutional shareholders have taken
advantage of the new rules to organize protests against corporate
executive pay practices."I
B. The SEC Executive Pay Disclosure Requirements
In conjunction with its revisions of the proxy rules, the SEC changed
Regulations S-K and S-B to require extensive disclosures about
corporate executive compensation.89 The new disclosures make it much
faster and easier for shareholders to determine how much a company's
top executives are being paid and in what form. The SEC also decided
that companies must disclose their philosophy about executive pay and
provide a written justification of the amounts awarded to their CEO in
the previous year."
These revisions required clearer presentation of top executives'
compensation, including imposing a duty on the Compensation
Committee to discuss the bases for the disclosed compensation and its
relationship to corporate performance.9' Specifically, the new rules
require the following disclosures. First, there must be a table disclosing
the amounts of compensation awarded to the company's CEO and the
four other most highly paid executives over the previous three years.
Second, a disclosure detailing the specific types of compensation given
to those executives in the past year is required. Third, the Compensation
Committee must prepare and disclose a report which states the com-
pany's compensation policies and the criteria upon which the CEO's
pay was based.92 Finally, the company must present a "performance
graph" that illustrates the return to the shareholders of the company
compared to a broad market index and an industry index of a group of
peer issuers for the previous five years. The SEC's revised rules further
87. See Stephen Choi, Proy Istsw Contests: Impact of the 1992 Proxy Reform (Mar. 24, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
88. See Heard, supra note 5, at 760 (citing several instances in which institutional investors used the
revised proxy system to try to stop company pay policies).
89. For an extensive discussion of the executive pay disclosure requirements, see THOMAS & DIXON,
supra note 53, §§ 8.01-.04; Halle Fine Terrion, Comment, Regulaion S-1; Item 402: The NewEvecutio
Compesation Disdsure Rules, 43 CASE W. RES. L REV. 1175 (1993); Heard, supra note 5, at 752-53.
90. See id at 752.
91. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 53, § 7.01; Terrion, supra note 89, at 1177.
92. In 1993, the SEC evaluated companies' compliance with the new guidelines and found that
although compliance was generally quite good, the Compensation Committee reports were too vague and
general in many cases. See Heard, supra note 5, at 755. The SEC urged companies to be more specific in
describing, among other things, the determination of compensation levels, the targets that needed to be
met, and the calculation of specific compensation amounts. See id.
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require disclosure of possible conflicts of interest which may exist for any
member of the compensation committee.93
Since that time, the SEC has continued to tinker with the executive
pay disclosure rules. For example, after Congress enacted section
162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code that limits companies' ability to
deduct annual executive compensation greater than $1 million,94 the
SEC amended the rules to mandate disclosure of company policies
concerning these deductions.95 The SEC is currently debating requiring
companies to make even greater executive pay disclosures.96
The revised executive pay disclosure rules have greatly increased the
amount and quality of information that is cheaply available to share-
holders about firms' executive compensation practices. This disclosure
gives shareholders sufficiently similar information about companies'
executive compensation practices to compare the different companies'
practices. This facilitates shareholder monitoring of corporate boards
and hels them determine the relationship between pay and perfor-
mance.
9
Public disclosure may have the perverse effect of increasing the level
of executive compensation, too. This argument would run as follows.
When there was no public disclosure of information about companies'
executive pay practices, compensation committees used their consul-
tants' private surveys of comparable companies' pay practices as a basis
for setting executive pay. The advent of public disclosure did not
change this system. However, it may have added pressure on CEOs to
demand more money in these negotiations in order to maintain (and
perhaps improve) their relative position in the pay hierarchy for top
executives. In other words, if CEOs feel pressure to "keep up with the
93. Se Tracey ScottJohnson, Note, Pay For terfomani. Corporat Excultime Compmsation in the 1990s,
20 DELJ. CORP. L 183, 196-97 (1995). As discussed infta at Part V.B, in 1992 the SEC also changed its
interpretation of the "ordinary business" exclusion of Rule 14a-7 to permit precatory shareholder proposals
concerning company's executive compensation policies to be included in the company's proxy materials.
See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 53, § 7.01; Terrion, supra note 89, at 1193 (stating that the SEC was
changing this interpretation to reflect the increase in shareholder and public concern over executive
compensation).
94. For further discussion of section 162(m), see Thomas, supra note 8.
95. The S1 million ceiling does not apply if an independent compensation committee establishes
a pay for performance program and the shareholders approve the plan. See id.; Heard, su/ra note 5, at 756.
96. Some shareholder advocates are calling for further disclosures about executive incentive plans
that aid managers in purchasing their companies' stock. See Sessa & Egodigwe, supra note 21, at Cl
(reporting that companies that offer interest-free loans to executives to purchase their stock, or that
implement guidelines about executive stock ownership, are not required to disclose this information in
many circumstances).
97. S Heard, supra note 5, at 755.
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Joneses," then the public disclosure of any failure to do so could lead
them to feel a loss of social standing and fuel their future pay demands.98
Increased mandatory disclosures are not costless for other reasons,
too.99 Each company incurs costs in complying with these requirements,
such as retaining attorneys to prepare them in compliance with the
SEC's regulations.' 0 Furthermore, this information is not costlessly
digested: shareholders must read it and determine whether they need to
take action. Many academics have questioned the net benefits of
mandated disclosures.' While the issue is ultimately an empirical one,
and the existing research is limited, l02 the value of increasing disclosure
levels will rest to a certain extent on whether shareholder monitoring
of executive compensation efforts based on these disclosures is effective.
98. The authors gratefully acknowledge Deborah DeMott's intuitive insight on this point. This
intuition could be formalized by reference to social comparison theory. This theory rests on the
observation that people compare themselves to other people in a variety of ways. These social comparisons
have significant consequences on people's perceptions and actions. .
The seminal article in this area was written by Leon Festinger entitled, A 7eoy of Social
Comparison Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117 (1954). Festinger claimed that people engage in self-evaluation of
their abilities and opinions by comparing themselves to other people who are similar in certain ways. He
believed that these comparisons can help people's self-esteem and egos about things they consider
important. Subsequent research has found this to be true, and that these comparisons can also be used to
further self-evaluations and improvements. See Charles A. O'Reilly, III et al., Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid
Managers: Equity and Excutive Compensation, at 9 (Stanford University Business School Working Paper 1996)
(summarizing research on these questions)). O'Reilly concludes that "there is compelling evidence that
individuals use social comparisons to evaluate their own performance and abilities as well as to increase self-
esteem." Id. at 10.
If CEOs compare themselves to their fellow CEOs, as seems highly likely, they will make
comparisons of their own compensation with that of other CEOs. These comparisons will lead to increased
pay demands whenever the CEO believes that she is underpaid compared to her equals. For further
discussion of how this theory relates to issues surrounding corporate executive compensation practices, see
Thomas, supra note 8.
99. See eg., Edmund W. Kitch, The lheuy and Prasctice of&curities Dscosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763
(1995) (discussing thoroughly the costs of mandatory disclosure).
100. Even if these documents are prepared by in-house counsel, there are still significant opportunity
costs associated with their production.
101. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. F'shel, MondatloDiscaos and the Protection ofnvestors,
70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984) (viewing skeptically the value of mandatory disclosure). Compare John C.
Coffee, Jr., Marktt Failure and the Economic Care for a Mandtoy Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717 (1984),
for a more sympathetic view.
102. See SUSAN PHILLIPS & RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 51 (1981)
(estimating costs of disclosures made by registered companies and companies offering new securities); Carol
J. Simon, Vie Effect of the 1933 Scrides Act on Investor Information and te Performance of New Issues, 79 AM.
ECON. REv. 295 (1989) (examining the risk and return of securities issued before and after the 1933
Securities Act was enacted and concluding that, although average returns for listed companies were
unaffected, risk levels appeared to be substantially lower after the act was enacted).
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V. SHAREHOLDERS' EFFORTS TO IMPACT ExECuTIVE
COMPENSATION
Shareholder groups have used a wide variety of approaches in their
attempts to monitor executive compensation. Some shareholders,
particularly institutional investors, have focused on the relationship
between corporate performance and executive pay.1 3 These groups
have tried to work informally with corporate boards to influence the
outcome of their decision making processes. Other shareholders have
been more militant, trying to use the shareholder voting mechanism as
a means of prodding boards to keep pay levels in check. This section
reviews the different techniques used by shareholders in recent years.
A. Informal Pressure on Boards of Directors
Some institutional investors believe that they have experienced very
limited success influencing corporate executive pay policies using the
voting process.'0 4 Despite their easier access to information about
corporate pay policies under the new SEC rules, and the reduced costs
of collective action after the 1992 proxy rule amendments, these
shareholders believe that executive compensation policies cannot be
monitored effectively through the proxy process because they are too
complex, poorly understood, and infrequently subjected to a share-
holder vote.0 5 Also, institutions fear that public confrontations with
management will jeopardize their access to corporate information
through informal channels. 6
These shareholders have relied instead more upon informal ap-
proaches to corporate boards to try to influence their executive
compensation practices. As major shareholders in most companies, they
have access to corporate managers and directors. Taking advantage of
this avenue of communication, they convey their views on compensation
103. See Heard, supra note 5, at 758; Gilson, supa note 72, at 677 (institutional investors should focus
on "the wisdom of pay for performance plans rather than the absolute compensation paid particular
executives").
104. See Heard, supra note 5, at 758.
105. See id. at 758 ("[Pjay plans themselves are very complex, not easily understood by many
shareholders, and subject to infrequent ratification. In most cases, objectionable pay practices come to light
after the fact, when voting can have only a very limited and largely symbolic impact.").
106. Another possible explanation of institutional shareholders' reluctance to challenge publicly
executive compensation levels may be that the institutions themselves are run by executives who do not
wish to have their own compensation attacked as unreasonable. See Yablon, supra note 51, at 1893. For
example, TIAA-CREF's beneficiaries have placed proposals to limit the pension funds' executives'
compensation on the fund's proxy card in recent years.
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to selected boards of directors privately." 7 Institutions have also used
informal negotiations, backed by the threat to force a shareholder vote,
as a method of prying concessions out of companies.t1'
For example, the Teachers Insurance Annuity Association - College
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) has concluded that boards are
better positioned than shareholders to monitor corporate pay policies.0 9
Instead of relying on shareholder voting as a monitoring mechanism,
TIAA-CREF has disseminated to corporate boards its policy statement
emphasizing the use of pay-for-performance and containing a list often
principles that it believes boards should apply to executive compensa-
tion."0  TIAA-CREF advocates that boards have Compensation
Committees comprised solely of independent directors. Other institu-
tional investors have developed similar executive compensation
guidelines."'
These policies vary but have important common features." 2 First,
they urge the board to assume responsibility for designing and adminis-
tering the executive pay plan. This generally includes a requirement
that the compensation committee have a majority of outside directors.
Second, these plans should limit the potential dilution that investors can
suffer from increases in stock-based compensation for executives. They
include specific ceilings on the amount of stock that can be issued under
long term compensation plans. Finally, most of these plans try to restrict
the use of certain practices that institutions find particularly objection-
able, such as repricing of stock options.' These shareholder groups
expect that boards will consider these guidelines in designing the
company's executive's pay plans.
107. See Heard, supra note 5, at 761.
108. See Kreinberg, supra note 59, at 167. Institutions have tried to get directors to take full
responsibility for designing and implementing appropriate executive pay plans. Heard, supra note 5, at 758.
109. eid at 761-62.
110. See id. One of these principles emphasizes the importance of board's communicating to
shareholders about executive compensation. Set id at 764.
111. S idat 754.
112. See id. at 759. Other institutions delegate these questions to third parties. Some of these
organizations have taken a differentapproach. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) tries
to limit the potential amount of wealth that can be transferred to executives, although leaving the details
of the design of the compensation package to the Compensation Committee. Se id
113. See id. Stock option repricing is a flashpoint for shareholder concern. Companies claim that
stock options lose their incentive value for executives if the stock price falls so far below the exercise price
that there is little chance the executive will exercise the option. Thus, they claim, the incentive effects of
this form of compensation no longer exist. To restore these incentives, companies drop the exercise price
of these existing options to the current level of their stock price, thereby "repricing" them.
Shareholder critics claim that option repricing is an egregious abuse of their rights. These
shareholders argue that the alignment of shareholder and management incentives only exists if executives
are unrewarded when stock prices fail to rise, or fall. Shareholders complain that they do not enjoy similar
treatment for their stock when the price of the company's shares falls.
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B. Precatoty Shareholder Proposals Using Rule 14a-8
Individual investors seeking to influence board's executive compensa-
tion decisions frequently turn to Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal
rule. Under this rule, shareholders of public companies have the ability,
subject to certain limitations and restrictions, to put proposals on the
company's proxy for its annual meeting." 4  This rule states that if a
security holder of a corporation notifies the company of its intention to
present a proposal for action at a forthcoming shareholders' meeting,
the company is required to include the proposal in its own proxy
material and to provide a means by which the security holders can vote
with respect to the proposal. However, the issuer can exclude a
proposal if the proponent fails to meet certain procedural eligibility
requirements or substantive content restrictions.'
If the company chooses to exclude a proposal, claiming that it fails to
meet Rule 14a-8's requirements, then it has the burden of demonstrat-
ing that its position is justified."6 Typically, it will advise the SEC of its
desire to exclude the proposal, and provide any legal authority that it
believes support exclusion, in an attempt to persuade the SEC to issue
a no-action letter." 7 If the company is successful in obtaining the no-
action letter, and subsequently chooses to omit the proposal, then the
shareholder proponent may file suit in federal district court seeking to
force the issuer to include its proposal in the company's proxy
materials. "8
Prior to 1992, many companies had successfully opposed including
shareholder proposals concerning executive compensation on their
proxy statements, claiming that they raised matters of ordinary business
subject to exclusion under Rule 14a-8(c)(7)." 9 Companies are permitted
to exclude matters of "ordinary business" because such issues fall within
the board and management's exclusive power with respect to profit-
114. For a more general discussion of Rule 14a-8, see THOMAS & DIXON, npra note 53, §§ 16.01-.05.
For a discussion for the 1998 amendments to Rule 14a-8, see Maya Mueller, The Shardtoder ProposalRule.
Cracker Bamr Institutionallnvestors, and the 1998 Amendme&nt, 28 Stetson L Rev. 451 (1998).
115. See Mueller, supra note 114. (discussing more completely these requirements).
116. Seid
117. A no-action letter is a letter from the SEC to the issuer stating that the SEC will not take any
legal action against the company if it omits the proposal. These letters are usually quite short and provide
only minimal guidance about the SEC's reasons for permitting exclusion.
118. The shareholder proponent has a private right of action under the federal securities laws. See,
e.g., Roosevelt v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding that a private
cause ofaction exists to enforce Rule 14a-8).
119. This section is now 14a-8()(7).
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making activities of the business under state statutory law. 120 Manage-
ment's exercise of its specialized talents are protected from investors
attempting to dictate the minutiae of daily business decisions. 12'
Compensation questions, the SEC staff determined, fell within this
exclusive province of the board, and therefore could not be challenged
by shareholders using Rule 14a-8.
In 1992, the SEC reversed its prior interpretation that the ordinary
business exception barred shareholder proposals concerning executive
compensation.122 In doing so, it noted that executive compensation
issues had become the focus of widespread public attention and debate
so that they were no longer in the realm of ordinary business matters.
As a result, the SEC concluded that shareholders were entitled to raise
these issues in precatory proposals using Rule 14a-8.1
23
Institutional shareholders have been reluctant to resort to shareholder
proposals in their efforts to alter executive compensation policies. 2
Individual investors, however, have filed a large number of shareholder
proposals concerning executive compensation with companies since
1992. These proposals covered a wide variety of different topics,
ranging from linking executive pay to a company's stock price to
restricting company pay to a low multiple of employee salaries.'
25
Few shareholder proposals of any kind garner majority support at the
ballot box. Using data from the 1994 proxy season, one study found
that, on average, 21.5% of shareholder votes are cast in favor of these
proposals.'26 This figure conceals some wide variations though. Exter-
nal corporate governance proposals, such as proposals to redeem the
company's Rights Plan, received the highest average percentage of
favorable votes (53.7%), whereas compensation proposals received
relatively low average percentages of favorable votes (12.8%).127 The
low vote totals on executive compensation proposals may reflect a
variety of factors, including the difficulty of understanding and evaluat-
ing complex plans, the need for institutional investors to evaluate these
120. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 52, at 59.
1121. See THOMAS &DIXON, supra note 53, § 16.04[G].
122. Heard, supra note 5, at 754-55.
123. S THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 53, § 16.04[G].
124. See Heard, supra note 5, at 761. According to this author, institutions have preferred to use
shareholder proposals for "structural questions, such as recommending the establishment of board-level
compensation committees consisting entirely of independent outside directors." Id This certainly is
consistent with the data concerning the sponsors ofshareholder resolutions. See Thomas & Martin, supra
note 52, at 75 tbl.2.
125. See Part VII infta for a discussion of the different types of issues raised by shareholder proposals
concerning executive compensation.
126. e e Thomas & Martin, supra note 52, at 76.
127. See id
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proposals on a case-by-case basis, and a lack of consensus among
investors over what the proper criteria are for evaluating executive
compensation plans.'
28
C. " Binding Bylaw Amendments on Executive Compensation Issues
Shareholders have recently begun presenting proposals to amend
company bylaws through a binding shareholder vote.129 The validity of
these proposals has been a hotly contested issue between management
and shareholder groups, especially with regard to the redemption of
poison pill anti-takeover defenses.' State corporate law generally
grants shareholders the unilateral right to amend corporate bylaws. 3'
The grant of similar powers to the board of directors in a company's
articles of incorporation or bylaws usually does not divest this right,
132
although a charter provision may explicitly deny shareholders the power
to initiate a bylaw amendment. 
33
State law usually has not imposed express limits on the substance of
corporate bylaws or shareholder--initiated amendments to the bylaws.
Thus, shareholders arguably may address through bylaw amendments
any aspect of the business or affairs of the corporation or the respective
rights and powers of the board and shareholders that is not barred
128. For example, CaIPERS domestic proxy voting guidelines concerning shareholder proposals on
executive compensation state that it will support "proposals that ask for increased pay disclosure or that ask
for shareholder approval of pay packages." CaLPERS, supra note 52.
129. Rule 14a-8 generally permits shareholders to submit binding resolutions on matters that state
law commits to the shareholder body. See THOMAS & DIXON, upra note 53, § 16.04[A], for a further
discussion of the issues discussed in this section. In other situations, the Commission staff has required that
a mandatory proposal for action that would run afoul of (cXl) be recast as precatory in order to be included
on the proxy statement. See id
130. Academic commentators are also divided over the question. Coms Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
Coporat Democraty anStocdolr-A doped By-LasL: Tadng Back The Sve, 73 TUL L REV. 409 (1998) (arguing
that such by-law changes are invalid except in very limited situations), withJeffrey N. Gordon, '7Ust Say
.Nevr" Poison i/, Deadhand Pils, and Sharzhldar-Adopd Bylaw: An Essay for Warm BufeS, 19 CARDOZO L
REV. 511 (1997) (shareholder bylaws should generally be upheld); Jonathan R. Macey, 77m Legaity and
Ufiliy oft e Sharewer Rih Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835 (1998) (same).
131. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 45, at 1055-58. See Bevis Longstreth & Nancy Kane,
Shxiho1dar' Groing Role in Eume Compmsakon N.Y.LJ., Feb. 27, 1992, at 5; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 109 (1991); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 601 (McKinney 1986); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (1996).
Se genera! , THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 53, § 16.04[A].
132. See R. Franklin Balotti & Daniel A. Dreisbach, 7w Peimiibe Sc*e of S&aholdr BylawAmmnents
in Delaoare, I CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 19,19 (Oct.-Nov. 1992); KennethJ. Bialkin & RichardJ.
Grossman, The Pffmi/e Scope ofShfafder BynwAmmdnm in Nan rod*, I CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR
25,25, (Oct.-Nov. 1992); see also DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1991); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAw § 601(a)
(McKinney 1986).
133. See DEL CODEANN. it. 8, § 109(a) (1991); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW§ 601(a) (McKinney 1986).
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explicitly by state law or the corporation's certificate of incorporation.1"
At some point, however, this broad shareholder power to adopt or
amend corporate bylaws must yield to the board's authority to manage
the business and affairs of the corporation. 3 ' The problem becomes one
of drawing the exact line between the respective authorities of directors
and shareholders under the relevant state law.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently determined that share-
holders of that state's corporations were entitled to pursue very broad
binding by-law amendments. In a case involving the Fleming Compa-
nies' efforts to stop a shareholder initiative to amend its bylaws to
require a mandatory shareholder vote before the company enacted any
poison pill anti-takeover defenses, the court found that the shareholders'
power to amend the corporate bylaws trumped the board's authority to
manage and direct the business and affairs of the corporation. The
court stated, "[w]e hold shareholders may propose bylaws which restrict
board implementation of shareholder rights plans, assuming the
certificate of incorporation does not provide otherwise."'3 6 Although the
potential impact of this case is difficult to assess, it marks the first time
that a state supreme court has upheld shareholders' right to enact
binding bylaw amendments on important anti-takeover defenses.' 3
Binding bylaw amendments have become increasingly popular in'
recent years: in the 1996 proxy season only two such proposals were
submitted to companies, while in the 1998 proxy season that number
had increased to twenty-two.3 8 In the 1999 proxy season, thirty binding
134. See Longstreth & Kane, supra note 131, at 5; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (1991);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 601(c) (McKinney 1986). According to Longstreth and Kane,
It is highly doubtful, as a matter of statutory construction, that shareholders, who are
expressly given the right to adopt or amend by-laws, which... may contain provisions
relating to the business and affairs of the corporation and the relative tights and powers of
directors and shareholders, are nonetheless preempted from exercising this right in
connection with any subject matter that directors have authority to address under their
power to manage.
Longstreth & Kane, supra note 131, at 5.
135. See Bialkin & Grossman, supm note 132, at 26-27 (observing that precisely when that point of
irreconcilable conflict is reached under New York law is unclear, but concluding that shareholders likely
would be barred from adopting bylaw amendments that unduly restricted the board's ability to determine
corporate-governance and executive-compensation matters); see also Balotti & Dreisbach, supra note 132,
at 21.
136. International Brotherhood ofTeamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 A.2d 907, 908 (Okla.
1999). See a/oJoann S. Lublin, Okhhma CourtAffmS Holdrs'RtAht to Pursue a Bindg Bylaw Proposal, WALL
ST. J.,Jan. 28, 1999, at B2.
137. See id. at B2.
138. Leslie Scism &Joann S. Lublin, Not Going to Take ItAnymom: Sharedzolders Push Bindig Eylaw
Measures To Force Change, WALL ST.J., Nov. 30, 1998, at C2.
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bylaw proposals have already been filed.' . Most of these proposals
concern external corporate governance topics, such as the redemption
of a company's poison pill anti-takeover defense.
Recently, some institutional shareholders have begun submitting
binding bylaw amendment proposals'concerning executive compensa-
tion issues. At first, the SEC took an adverse position in a no-action
letter involving the Shiva Corporation, raising a difficult barrier to
getting these proposals on the corporate ballot."4 In that no-action
letter, the SEC permitted Shiva to omit a shareholder proposal for a
mandatory bylaw amendment prohibiting the company from repricing
stock options without shareholder approval because the SEC decided
that this proposal raised matters of ordinary business and was therefore
excludable under subsection (c)(7).
This obstacle appears to have been removed by a subsequent SEC
ruling. In 1998, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB)
proposed a binding bylaw amendment to require shareholder approval
of any future repricings of corporate stock options at General
Datacomm Industries. 4' On December 9, 1998, the SEC informed the
company that it could not exclude the proposal as pertaining to the
company's ordinary business operations, in light of "the widespread
public debate concerning option repricing and the increased recognition
that this issue raises significant policy issues."''  At General
Datacomm's annual meeting, a majority of the shareholders voting cast
their votes in favor of adopting the proposed bylaw amendment. 43
The SEC's decision to permit this proposal opens the door for further
binding bylaw amendment proposals on executive compensation. 44
With the Oklahoma Supreme Court's ruling in the Fleming Companies
case, many commentators are predicting significant increases in the
number of these proposals.
145
139. See Lublin, supra note 136, at B2.
140. See Shiva Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1005 (May 1, 1998)
(reviewed and affirmed by the SEC).
141. See Scism & Lublin, supra note 138, at Cl.
142. General Datacomm Industries, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 Sec No-Act LEXIS 1037, at
*1 (Dec. 9, 1998). The SEC also noted that there was no "compelling state law precedent" which would
lead it that such a bylaw restriction was improper under Delaware law. Id. See alo General Datacomm
Indsim Inc.: Vote Must Be Pniuted on Optons, SECDecids, WALL ST.J., Dec. 10, 1998, at B23.
143. See Paul M. Sherer & Barbara Tierney, Shalzoder Block General Datacomm From Reducing Employee
Options Price, WALL ST.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A6. "The bylaw amendment gained 52% of the votes at the
company's annual meeting ...." Id.
144. SWIB has already announced a proposal to require shareholder approval of future option
repricings at Cambridge Technology Partners Inc. Theywng/k Re/iciW Ronbe, WALL ST.J., Dec. 15, 1998,
at B6.
145. See Lublin, supra note 136, at B2.
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D. Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans
Until a few years ago, most, if not all, companies' stock option plans
had to be approved by their shareholders. 6 As boards of directors
awarded ever-larger numbers of stock options, shareholder resistance to
approving these plans increased substantially. One study found that
Where once there was an assumption that any plan presented by
management and directors for approval would receive no more than
a token 3% to 5% disapproval, the 1995 and 1996 proxy seasons saw
significantly stronger shareholder resistance to these plans, as votes
against stock option plans in the range of 20-40% become more
commonplace. 147
Although only three companies' proposals were defeated in the time
period covered by that survey, another twenty-eight proposals received
negative votes of forty percent or more.
48
More recent data for stock option plans put up for votes between July
1997 toJune 1998 show that fifteen were defeated out of the more than
two-thousand plans proposed."4 These defeated plans potentially would
have increased the dilution of existing shareholders by between eight
percent and thirty-three percent. 5 ° High negative votes were recorded
against a large number of the other plans.' 5'
This potential trend of increasing shareholder opposition to company
stock option plans has coincided with several little-noticed changes in
SEC and stock exchange regulations that have chipped away at the
requirement that stock option plans be approved by shareholders. Prior
to 1996, Rule 16b-3 required shareholder approval of employee benefit
plans that were to be exempt from section 16(b) of the 1934 Exchange
Act, the short swing prohibition for corporate insiders.'52 In 1996, the
146. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 5.
147. Id. at 10.
148. Se i; see aLso id at 29 tbl.5.
149. SeeJoann S. Lublin & Leslie Scism, Stock Options at Fmns Irk Some Investors, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 12,
1999, at C4 (citing Richard Wagner of Strategic Compensation Research Associates). Furthermore, those
plans that were approved frequently had high percentages of votes cast against them.
150. See id.
151. However, a 1997 study by the Investor Responsibility Research Corporation (IRR- shows that
S&P 500 companies requesting more than 10% of the company's shares for new plans received fewer
average negative votes in 1997 than 1996. See Robert W. Newbury, IIRC, PotntialDilutionfom Stock Plans
at S&PSuper 1,500 Companies, (April 1998) (on file with author). For the full S&P 1,500, the average level
of negative votes exceeded 20% for plans that would result in total potential dilution of more than 15%.
152. Before 1996, Rule 16b-3 stated that an employee benefit plan was exempt from section 16(b)
ifit had been approved "[b]y the affirmative votes ofthe holders of a majority of the securities" or by their
written consent. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(bX)-(2) (1995). Sm also Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 6, 11.
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SEC reformulated the rule so that exempt plans need only be approved
by the board of directors, a disinterested committee of the board of
directors, or the shareholders.' 53 This change eliminated one reason
why corporations sought shareholder approval of stock option plans.
But companies may still need to submit their stock option plans for
shareholder approval for several other reasons. First, a few important
state corporate codes require shareholder approval of stock option
plans." Furthermore, all states require shareholder approval if the
corporate charter must be amended to increase the number of autho-
rized shares of stock for a stock option plan.
Second, under the tax code, companies obtain tax benefits if
shareholders approve certain types of stock option plans. 55 Section
162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) allows companies to deduct
executive compensation in excess of $1 million if it is paid out under the
terms of a performance-based stock option plan. 5 6 The IRC's definition
of performance-based plans requires that the plan be approved by
shareholders in order to qualify for this advantageous treatment.'57
Finally, the national stock exchanges all have rules requiring
shareholder approval of many stock option plans. 5 Recently, these
requirements have been under attack. For example, until 1998, the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required listed companies to seek
shareholder approval for virtually all stock option plans that were not
"broadly based."' 59 In January of 1998, however, the NYSE sought
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d)(1)(1998). In addition, the plan can provide that the securities be
held for more than six months. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b.3(d)(3) (1998). See aLs Wagner & Wagner, supra
note 71, at 12.
154. For example, the New York Business Corporation Law states that "[t]he issue of... rights or
options to one or more directors, officers or employees of the corporation ... shall be authorized by a
majority of the votes cast at a meeting of shareholders." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 505(d) (McKinney 1986);
see afro Wagner & Wagner, mpra note 71, at 13 (discussing the treatment of option plans under various state
laws).
155. See id. at 14-15 (discussing option plans under the tax code).
156. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (1998). Incentive stock options (ISOs) are a second type of stock
option plan that is tax advantaged but requires shareholder approval. 5 Wagner & Wagner, supra note
71, at 15. ISO options create no taxable income for employees when they exercise the option and purchase
the stock. Furthermore, if the employee holds the stock for a minimum of one year, there is no taxable gain
to the employee until she sells the underlying stock. S&x id. However, ISO plans are used primarily for
lower-or middle-level corporate employees because their awards are limited to a maximum value of
$100,000.
157. 26 U.S.C. § 162(mX4XC)ii) (1998). See aimo Wagner & Wagner, wpma note 71, at 14. It is possible
that stock option plans directed solely to officers and directors who are not "covered individuals" under the
IRO's definition could be considered performance-based, but this would require excluding the company's
CEO and the four other highest paid individuals. See id.
158. See id. at 12-13.
159. See sdf-&gatoM O ;zeat o of Fl ofpd Rul U o rek Stock chwag
Inc. Rdating to Shr&Okie&rAppmvul i&,, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39659, 1998 WL 63612, at *I (Feb.
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SEC approval to expand the types of option plans that were exempt
from shareholder approval. 160  One of the proposals expanded the
definition of a broadly based plan and created a non-exclusive "safe
harbor" for those plans in which twenty percent of the company's
employees, half of whom must be neither officers nor directors, are
eligible to participate. 161 Plans falling within the safe harbor would not
require shareholder approval. The SEC received no comments on the
proposed rule changes and approved them on April 8, 1998.162
The adoption of the rule changes triggered an uproar by many
institutional investors. They objected that under the new rules
companies could easily could design option plans that would not need
shareholder approval. 63  In response to these objections, the NYSE
established a task force which recommended further changes to the
rules.' 64 Pursuant to this recommendation, the NYSE again proposed
changes to the shareholder approval rules in October of 1 9 9 8 .165 Under
the new proposals, an option plan is classified as "broadly-based" if a
majority of the company's full-time, exempt employees in the United
States are eligible to participate in it and if, within the shorter of three
years or the term of the plan, a majority of the shares awarded under the
plan go to employees who are not officers or directors.
66
A number of large institutional investors objected to the revised
proposals. 167 On December 28, 1998, the SEC extended the period in
12, 1998). The one exception was for plans designed to induce someone not previously employed with the
company to join the firm.
160. See id at "2.
16 1. S id In addition, the proposal stated that when deciding ifa plan is broad-based, a variety of
factors would be examined, such as the number of people covered by the plan and the nature of the
employees. Another significant proposed change was that non-broad-based plans that dilute shareholder
equity less than 5% would no longer require shareholder approval. See id
162. SSdf-Rtgulnto ni zatiorg ; New Toik Stock FA Inc.: Order Csntiug Approval to Proposed Rule
Change the New 0 'oik StockEmcm W Inc. Reiating to Shareholder Approval Poiy, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
39839, 1998 WL 164369 (Apr. 8, 1998). In granting approval to the changes, the Commission stated that
"the changes proposed by the NYSE will provide listed companies with more flexibility in issuing stock
option or purchase plans while still adequately protecting shareholder rights to approve those plans that
will have a material effect on their equity." Id. at 03. The New York Stock Exchange Listed Company
Manual contains the new rules in section 312.03.
163. See BkBoardApPrves TWhIer Definitin of Stock-Option Plan, WALL ST.J., Oct. 2, 1998, at B 10.
164. See S, #f- ,da*,y Om ations; Notia of &ig ofProed Rul Change by the New rk Stock vc&ang;
Inc., Relating to Shareholder Approval of Stock Option Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40679, 1998 WL
788860, at *3 (Nov. 13, 1998). The Task Force was comprised of representatives of the Individual Investors
Advisory Committee and Pension Managers Advisory Committee as well as representatives of committees
associated with companies or the NYSE itself. See id
165. &Se id. at*l.
166. Se id
167. For example, in November of 1998, the Council of Institutional Investors sent a letter to the
SEC stating that no option plan should be exempted from shareholder approval. See B Board Proosal on
Stock Opons at ListedFinns Cmw UnderAtiack, WALLST.J.,Jan. 25, 1999, atC6 [hereinafter B4Board]. In
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which it would receive comments on the new proposal to January 25,
1999.168 Thus, at the present, the " /20%" rule remains intact.
69
In summary, companies have greater regulatory flexibility to avoid
seeking shareholder approval for their stock option plans. 7 ' The
changes to the stock exchange requirements, combined with the
revisions of the SEC's short-swing profit regulations, weaken the
requirement of shareholder approval of stock option plans.
Undoubtedly, some of the pressure to lessen the need for shareholderapproval stems from the increased levels of shareholder opposition.
This opposition seems likely to continue to grow, given the already high
level of officer and director stock ownership--over 3.5% average
beneficial ownership at large American companies.' 7' How investors
will respond to companies' decisions not to seek authorization of their
stock option plans remains to be seen.
E. "j7ust Vote No" Campaigns
In 'Just Vote No" campaigns, shareholders withhold approval from
the company's unopposed board slate at the annual election of directors
to pressure management to improve its performance.'72 Although these
campaigns have largely symbolic value, the negative publicity generated
may provide a strong impetus for governance-related changes.'
the letter, the Council accused the NYSE of being "blatantly conflicted" by its desire to attract to its listings
companies which have option plans favorable to executives and urged the SEC to "reclaim this issue as its
own." Id. Another group with strong institutional investor ties, Institutional Shareholder Services, argued
that the NYSE was trying to compete with the Nasdaq for listings of high-tech companies when "executive
compensation and [option] plans are a hot-button issue." Id.
168. See Sf-Regdatory Organizations; Notice of tension of the Comment Period for the Proposed Rule Change
by the New rork Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to ShmtholderApproval of Stock Option Plans, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-40847, 1998 WL 898486, at *1 (Dec. 28, 1998). As a result of this extension; the proposed rule will
likely not be adopted in time for the 1999 proxy season. See Big Bord, supra note 167, at C6.
169. See Big Board May Alter Stock-Option 1ol, y to Cahn Shareholders, WALL ST.J., Mar. 24, 1999, at CI I
(the NYSE states that the 20% rule will be in effect only through the end of September 2000).
170. See Wagner& Wagner, supra note 71, at 10.
171. This number grows to 11.9% if we take into account the tremendous potential dilution of
shareholders' equity that could result if already authorized but unissued, and already granted but unvested,
stock options actually are granted and exercised. See id
172. SeeJoseph A. Grundfest, Jut Vote No: A Mimirit twatofor Dealig Wth Barbarians Inside the
Gaes, 45 STAN. L REV. 857 (1993).
173. See Regulation of Communications Among Secuityholders, Exchange Act Release No. 30,849,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 85,002, at 82,838 (June 24, 1992) (recognizing increas-
ing shareholder use of this tactic to communicate with corporate management, and proposing enhanced
disclosure of proxy voting results, including the number of votes withheld from each board candidate, in
the next quarterly report on Form 1O-Qor Form 10-K). This new disclosure requirement was adopted in
October 1992. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 53, § 6.04(B)(19) n.334; John Pound, 7he Rise of de
Political Model ofCorporate Goernance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L REV. 1003, 1052 & n. 194 (1993).
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Institutional shareholders have actively participated in these campaigns,
spotlighting selected issues, such as executive compensation.
The earliest use of the 'Just Vote No" campaign being used in the
executive compensation area was SWIB's 1993 campaign at Paramount
Communications, Inc. 71 SWIB protested the Compensation Commit-
tee's decision to award large incentive bonuses to the company's top
executives after the company's relatively poor performance. SWIB
withheld its votes for the Compensation Committee's members and
urged other institutional investors to do the same. These efforts led
other institutional investors to mount similar campaigns at other
companies. 175
More recently, the shareholders of the Walt Disney Company used
a 'Just Vote No" campaign in 1997 to protest that company's
"multimillion-dollar payout to former President Michael Ovitz and a
rich new contract for Chairman and Chief Executive Michael
Eisner."' 76 Institutional and individual shareholders withheld thirteen
percent of the votes cast for the five company directors that were up for
reelection at the meeting while eight percent of the shareholders voted
against Eisner's new contract.'
77
Institutional shareholders can participate in these campaigns without
triggering the federal proxy rules solicitation provisions if they are
careful to stay within the terms of certain safe harbors. As was discussed
in Part III.A, shareholders can publish or broadcast announcements of
how they plan to vote without complying with the federal proxy rules,
so long as they are not soliciting proxies.'78 This regulatory safe harbor
extends to shareholders' announced reasons for their decision to vote,
abstain, or withhold proxies. They can also encourage one another to
attend meetings and vote against management, so long as they do not
solicit proxies to do so themselves.
Pension funds can also communicate their voting intentions to their
beneficiaries without fear of violating the federal proxy rules.'79 There
is no limit on the number of exempt statements relating to a specific
174. See Heard, supra note 5, at 760.
175. S id.
176. See Bruce Orwall, .Dise Holders Derry Payouts at Meeting, WALL ST.J., Feb. 26, 1997, at A3.
177. See ie An additional 3.2% abstained from voting. See id. TIAA-CREF launched an important
'Just Say No" campaign in March of 1999 against Lubrizol Corporation, seeking to get its board of
directors to redeem that company's dead-hand poison pill anti-takeover defense. SeeJoann S. Lublin,
Lubnizol and TIMA-CREF Fund Duel Over "'ead-Hand" Tabove Defense, WALL ST.J., Mar. 23, 1999, at A4.
TIAA-CREFF hired proxy solicitors to encourage the company's shareholder to withhold their votes from
the five directors that were up for election at the Company's 1999 annual meeting. See id,
178. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(/(2)(iv) (1997).
179. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(/(2)iv) (1997).
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solicitation that the shareholders may make, so long as they do not seek
proxy voting authority from others. Within these limitations, institu-
tional investors can actively participate in 'Just Vote No" campaigns.
VI. SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL WORK
Researchers seeking to study the effectiveness of shareholder
monitoring efforts have focused on the effects of shareholder proposals.
This empirical research has concentrated on determining the factors
that lead shareholders to target certain firms, the determinants of voting
support for shareholder proposals and the success of different types of
sponsors. 80 Most researchers hypothesize that investors can be expected
to be active monitors81 of managers when the benefits of such monitor-
ing exceed the costs.182 The benefits of active monitoring include any
increase in the value of the investor's holdings, weighted by the
probability of being successful in bringing about the requested changes.
180. There are a number of other important topics that researchers have examined but which are
outside the scope of this paper. These questions include the effect of shareholder proposals on firm value.
The studies reach conflicting conclusions. Compare Stephen L Nesbitt, Long-tenn Rewardsfim Shareholder
Activism A Stu4 ofthe "CaLPERS"Effect, 6J. APP. CORP. FIN. 75 (1994) (finding positive wealth effects related
to shareholder proposals); Deon Strickland et al., A Requiem for the USA" L Sma! Sharho/der Monitoring
Effective? 40J. FIN. ECON. 319, 334 (1996) (same); Michael P. Smith, Shfreholder Activism by Instibutiond
Inrestors: Eoidm firom CaLPERS, 51J. FIN. 227, 243-45 (1996) (same); Tim Opler &Jonathan Sokobin, Does
Coordinated Institutional Activism Work An An/ysz of de Activites of At Council of Insmtional Investors 6 (April
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (same); John M. Bizjak & ChristopherJ. Marquette,
Are Shareholder Proposals A/ Bark and no Bite? Eidence nrm Shareholder Reso tions to Rescind Poison Pis 23 (Jan.
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (same) with Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Corporate
Governance and Shrolder nati: Ftirical Evidence 31 (May 8, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors) (finding no positive wealth effect from shareholder proposals); Sunil Wahal, Pension FundActivism
and Finn Performance, 31 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 1, 20 (1996) (same); Stuart Gillian and Laura Starks,
Relationshi rvesting and SharolderActivism by h /utiona Investors(1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors) (same).
We chose not to investigate the impact of executive compensation proposals on firm value. Our
reason for not doing so is that the companies in our sample are very large companies with billions of dollars
of sales and market capitalization. See Table 5, infra. Even if a firm responded to a shareholder proposal
by completely eliminating the company's CEO's pay, this will only lead to on average about a six million
dollar increase in the company's net revenues. This is a small fraction of a percent of these company's
value. Of course, in reality, no company would eliminate CEO pay. So the direct impact of these
proposals on firm value is very unlikely to be significant.
181. By active monitors, we mean those investors who engage in activities that represent overt
attempts to affect management decision making. In this paper, we focus on one form of activism, the use
of shareholder proposals. Other forms of activism include litigation and informal negotiations with the
board regarding the performance of the firm. See Wahal, supra note 180, at 4-5.
182. See Smith, supra note 180, at 229. For a formal model of monitoring decisions on the part of
institutional investors, see Anat R. Admati et al., Large Shar iiolderAc'vim, Risk Sharing, and FinancialMarket
Equilibriwm, 102J. POL ECON. 1097 (1994) (describing the circumstances under which large institutional
shareholders with diversified portfolios have incentives to engage in monitoring despite free-riding by other
shareholders).
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Active monitoring is more likely to occur when investors perceive a
greater probability of success in achieving change that has a positive
effect on the value of their holdings. Investors will also be more likely
to engage in monitoring when their costs are low. The costs of share-
holder proposals are relatively low compared to other alternative
monitoring techniques.
Several studies have identified factors that influence investors to target
particular firms for activism. Researchers asked investors such as
CalPERS 83 United Shareholders ofAmerica (USA),'" and the Council
of Institutional Investors (CII),8 5 about the factors they used to identify
targets. These studies show that investors' criteria often change over
time. For example, CalPERS in 1987 and 1988 focused on corporate
governance structures, using the size of its own holdings, and the level
of institutional holdings in the firm to refine its list of targets. 86 In
subsequent years, CalPERS predominantly focused on firm perfor-
mance, with the level of stock ownership by insiders, employee stock
ownership plans (ESOPs), other institutions, and CalPERS, being used
as secondary factors.'
8 7
Similar patterns are observed with CII and USA. CII's criteria in
recent years have emphasized stock performance, whereas previously
they focused on factors such as governance characteristics and whether
executives were overcompensated.'" During its years of operation,
USA considered firm financial performance, whether top executive
compensation plans were tied to corporate performance, and the exis-
tence of policies that limited shareholder input on corporate governance
issues. '9 In general, these studies suggest firm performance has become
increasingly important for investors in how they select firms for activism.
Statistical tests underscore the importance of firm performance and
the other factors identified above as predictors of which firms are
183. Sea Smith, supra note 180, at 231-32.
184. See Strickland et al., supra note 180, at 320.
185. Sea Opler & Sokobin, supra note 180 (manuscript at *4).
186. See Smith, supra note 180, at 231-32.
187. Sea id. Smith also reports that the target selection process became more sophisticated. In
particular, firms within CalPERS' portfolio are first ranked according to their five-year stock returns and
the bottom quartile (called the "Bottom 250") are selected. The remaining factors (those based on
ownership of shares) are used to eliminate firms until about 50 remain. From this list (called the "Failing
Fifty"), about 12 are chosen to target. Said. at 232.
188. See Opler & Sokobin, sprm note 180, (manuscript at *4). By 1994, CH relied solely on past stock
performance over a five-year window. Id.
189. See Strickland et al., supra note 180, at 320.
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targeted for shareholder activism."9 Using a sample of 866 shareholder
proposals presented at 317 firms between March 1986 and October
1990, Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling 9' reported that firms targeted
for activism tended to have poorer financial performance as compared
to a matched sample. Targeted firms were also larger and had higher
levels of institutional ownership.'92 John and Klein 93 found that during
the 1991 proxy year, proposals were more likely to be received by larger
S&P 500 firms reporting negative net income in the prior year. Bizjak
and Marquette 9 4 reported that the 115 companies receiving 193
proposals to rescind shareholder rights plans between 1986 and 1993
had poorer market and accounting performance prior to receiving the
proposal than a sample of matched firms. Other differences with the
matched sample suggested that targeted firms had higher levels of
institutional ownership, were larger in size, and unlike the findings of
previous studies, also had smaller levels of insider ownership.'95
Strickland and his colleagues, examining firms targeted by the USA,
reported similar results.Y In general, these findings are consistent with
investors targeting those firms in which the expected benefits of activism,
and the probability of success, are greater.
190. Smith was one of the few to find no significant performance difference between targeted and
other firms. See Smith, supra note 180, at 237-38. Smith's results, based on a comparison between
CaIPERS's targeted companies and other firms in the "Bottom 250," may have been due in part to the
truncation in the variation in firm performance caused by limiting the sample to the bottom quartile of
CaIPERS's initial performance-based ranking of firms. The findings do suggest that once in the "Bottom
250," poorer performance did not increase the probability of being in the final list of 12 or so targeted firms.
Examining the relationship between the number of shareholder proposals and measures of firm
performance, Daily and her colleagues conclude that shareholder proposals and firm performance are
unrelated. See Catherine M. Daily et al., Institutional Investor Acgtuism. Follow thle Leaders? 30 (1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
191. Se Karpoffet al., supra note 180.
192. See i (manuscript at 16).
193. e generally Kose John & Amy Klein, Shareholder PAvposaLs and Corporate Governance (1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
194. See Bizjak & Marquette, supra note 180.
195. Seeid (manuscript at 12-13). Other studies examining the level of insider ownership found no
differences between targeted and other firms. See Karpoffet al., supra note 180; Smith, supra note 180.
196. See Strickland et al., supra note 180, at 327. When prior stock performance, financial
performance, market-to-book value of equity ratio, firm size, and various ownership characteristics were
entered simultaneously, however, only firm size and the number of shareholders were found related to the
probability of being targeted. Seeid
197. Examining firm performance relative to the firm's industry, Wahal, wpra note 180, reported that
firms targeted between 1987 and 1993 by the nine pension funds in his data set underperformed their
industries on two accounting measures, see id. at 18, but actually outperformed their industries on abnormal
holding period returns, see id. at 17.
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Other studies have examined the determinants of the number of votes
cast in favor of shareholder proposals.' In Gordon and Pound's
analysis of 266 shareholder corporate-governance proposals voted on
between September 1989 andJune 1990,19 lower "long-run" measures
of performance and price-earnings ratios were correlated with higher
levels of votes in favor of proposals to change certain corporate
governance features of the firms.2" Similarly, proposals sponsored by
the USA between 1990 and 1993 received greater support when firm
performance was mediocre.20 1  Focusing on proposals to rescind a
poison pill, Bizjak and Marquette reported in a similar vein that mean
operating income and prior stock performance were negatively related
to the amount of support shown.2 °2  However, in examining
management-supported anti-takeover charter amendments, Brickley
and his colleagues2°3 found that firm performance measures (prior stock
performance and return on assets) were unrelated to the percent support
received, although these measures were associated with the probability
that the measure passed.2°
Only one study has examined any of these issues using share-
holder proposals relating to executive compensation. Johnson and
Shackell used data concerning 169 shareholder proposals on executive
compensation for the period of 1992 to 1995 to examine how sharehold-
ers use the information contained in the expanded proxy statement
disclosures following the 1992 revision of the federal proxy rules.20 5 The
overwhelming majority of these proposals were submitted by individual
shareholders.
Johnson and Shackell find that larger companies and firms with
negative press coverage of their executive compensation policies were
more likely to receive shareholder proposals. Johnson and Shackell also
reported that shareholder voting support was greater for proposals
198. Summarizing literature investigating institutional monitoring, Black concludes that shareholder
proposals at companies with poor long-term performance or "strong pro-incumbent rules" receive more
support. See Bernard S. Black, The Value oflnstitiona Investor Moniong: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 895, 926 (1992).
199. See lilli A. Gordon &John Pound, Information, Ownership Struchffe, and Shareholder Voting: FAidnce
from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals, 48J. FIN. 697 (1993).
200. Seeid. at712-13.
201. See Strickland et al., supra note 180, at 332.
202. See Bizjak & Marquette, supra note 180 (manuscript at 16).
203. SeeJames A. Brickley et al., Cwporate Voting: Evidence from CharterAmendrmen Proposals, I J. CORP.
FIN. 5, 22, 26 (1994).
204. The probability that a measure passed in their analysis was defined according to the voting rules
applicable. Their data reflected four such rules: (1) majority of votes cast; (2) supermajority of votes cast;
(3) majority of shares outstanding and (4) supermajority of shares outstanding. Indicators of which rule was
applicable were also included in their model. See id at 24-26.
205. &eJohnson & Shackell, supra note 63.
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submitted at poorly performing firms, although the specific characteris-
tics of the company's executive compensation plans did not affect voting
support. Finally, they found no evidence that compensation committees
cut executive compensation upon receipt of a shareholder proposal, nor
that higher levels of shareholder support for such proposals led to
reductions in executive compensation.0 6
VII. EMPIRIcAL RESULTS
A. Description of the Data
This paper investigates the targeting of compensation proposals and
their impact on executive compensation levels. The data are comprised
of information on the proposals combined with compensation data for
CEOs of sample firms in the year of and the year following the
appearance of the proposals on the firms' proxy statements. For each
proposal, we obtained the identity of the targeted firm, the date of the
shareholders' meeting, the type of proposal, the identity of the sponsor,
and the voting results from the Investor Responsibility Research
Center's (IRRC) Corporate Governance Service for the 1993 through
1997 proxy seasons. We collected compensation data on each sample
firm's CEO, as well as firm performance data from Standard & Poor's
ExecuComp database and matched it to the year of the proxy state-
ment.
20 7
206. See id. at 24-25.
207. For example, ifa proposal appears on a proxy statement dated April 30, 1997, we consider 1996
to be the year of the proposal and 1997 to be the year after the proposal. We adopt this convention for the
following reasons. Using the above example, we assume that a 1996 executive compensation proposal
would be submitted in response to the announcement of the management 1995 pay levels earlier in 1996.
This assumption is based on two observations. First, compensation committees typically meet in the spring
after the close of the fiscal year. However, they do not publicly announce executive pay levels for the next
year until the issuance of the proxy statement for the following year. Second, shareholder proposals need
to be submitted at least 180 days prior to the next annual meeting in order to be placed in the company's
proxy materials. This means that they are drafted and submitted to the company in the year prior to the
calendar year of the annual meeting, usually in the fall. So in opr example, the 1996 proxy statement will
disclose the 1995 pay for top executives, then shareholder proposals reacting to that announcement would
be filed in the fall of 1996.
We assume that if this 1996 shareholder proposal has any impact on the board of directors' and
compensation committee's deliberations over executive pay levels, this impact will be on the 1997 pay
levels. We believe this is a reasonable assumption. The company will be in possession of the shareholder
proposal well before the spring compensation committee meetings. The directors, especially those on the
compensation committee, should also be aware of the proposals for two reasons. First, management should
have informed the compensation committee about these proposals, and the company's position concerning
them, as part of the negotiations between management and the board over executive pay. In our
discussions with directors that sit on compensation committees, they informed us that it would be good
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The IRRC reports a total of 195 different firms experiencing a total
of 227 shareholder proposals on compensation topics during the sample
period. Due to data availability constraints, 20 8 our final sample consists
of 168 proposals received by a total of 145 different firms. In most
years, a company receives only one compensation proposal. However,
for nineteen companies, two proposals were received in the same year,
and in two cases, the company received three proposals in the same
year.
Each proposal is placed into one of seven categories, "Report,"
"Disclose," "Approve," "Cap," "Link," "Reduce," or "Restrict" based
on our reading of the nature of the proposal. Table 1 contains a brief
description of each type of proposal. To facilitate comparisons between
the different types of proposals, we group the proposals into two broad
categories; : "Disclosure" proposals, comprised of the "Report" and
"Disclose" categories, and "Restrictive" proposals, which include
"Approve," "Cap," "Link," "Reduce," and "Restrict" categories.
B. Voting Outcomes
Table 2 shows that the proposals in the sample are fairly evenly
distributed throughout the five-year period. A total of thirty-six
proposals occurred in the 1993 proxy season, forty-one in 1994, twenty-
six in 1995, twenty-nine in 1996, while thirty-six proposals were
submitted in the 1997 season. Table 2 also shows the average percent-
age of the shareholder vote that was cast in favor of the proposals by
corporate practice for management to do so and that they would be upset to learn about the proposals only
after pay negotiations have been concluded. Second, by the time that the compensation committee is
meeting concerning management's pay in the spring, the proposal will have been put into the company's
draft proxy materials. All of the company's directors will review these materials as part of their regular
duties. Thus, the members of the compensation committee will learn of the proposals at this point, if they
have not already been informed about them by management earlier.
The company's proxy solicitors will advise the directors of the approximate expected level of
shareholder support for these proposals even before the shareholder vote is held. At most companies, the
company's proxy solicitors will consult with the board about the upcoming 1997 shareholders' meeting and
inform them about the issues that will be raised. The solicitors will have projections about the likely
shareholder vote tallies. These should include estimates of how shareholders will vote on all of the
shareholder proposals on the proxy card, including the executive compensation proposals. Compensation
committee members may also have other information about the shareholder proposals. They may have
been contacted individually, or as a collective, by large shareholders that have concerns about the
company's executive pay plans, or at least have been informed by management about such contacts.
208. We were forced to delete observations from our data set because of missing data. For example,
18 proposals were deleted from the sample because we could not locate their proxy statements online using
the LEXIS research database. An additional 27 proposals were deleted because we could not find executive
compensation data for them in the ExecuComp database. The remaining deletions were made for similar
reasons.
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year and type of proposal. For the entire sample, the average percent
of the vote cast in favor of the proposals is 11.3%.2o9 Although none of
the proposals receive enough votes for passage, some proposals clearly
receive more support than others given that the percentage of votes in
favor of the proposals ranges from 1.6% to 39.1 %. In general, "Restric-
tive" proposals receive significantly more support, on average, than do
"Disclosure" proposals. The average vote for "Restrictive" proposals is
12.0%, while the average for "Disclosure" proposals is 9 .9 %. The t-
statistic for the difference in means is 2.38 (p-value = 0.019).21°
Table 3 categorizes the proposals by sponsor and by type of proposal
and also shows the percentage of votes cast in favor of the proposals.
Individuals are the most common sponsor with 126 proposals (7 5 % of
the sample), followed by churches with eleven proposals (7%), labor
unions with nine proposals (5%), and one institutional investor sponsor.
A total of twenty-one proposals could not be classified because the
sponsors were not identified in the proxy statements. Although non-
individual sponsors are not numerous, it appears their proposals are
usually of a specific type. For example, all of the church-sponsored
proposals involve the Report type of proposal, whereas most of the labor
union proposals are the Restrict type. Nevertheless, there is no
significant difference between the average percentage vote for the
proposals for sponsors that are individuals and those that are not
individuals (11.5% versus 11.1%, respectively, t-statistic for the
difference in means = 0.28).
While not shown in a table, we also categorize proposals as either
Corporate Governance or Social Policy proposals based on the
supporting statements made in the proxies by the proposal sponsor.21'
We make this distinction because these proposals offer completely
different justifications for changing executive pay practices which may
209. We note that the average percentage of votes in favor of executive declines significantly over the
time period of our study (1993-1997). This is true irrespective of the type ofproposal. We hypothesize that
this decline may be the result of several factors, including that the stock market's strong performance toward
the end of this period may have led investors to be more sanguine about corporate pay levels, that hot
button issues like pay-for-performance and the use of independent directors on compensation committees
cooled off considerably as most companies adopted these ideas, and that Rule 14a-8 was not available
during this time period as a method of seeking binding bylaw amendments on stock option repricings. See
supra, Part V.B for further discussion of these amendments.
We note that shareholders approved the first stock option repricing proposal submitted under
Rule 14a-8, with more than 52% of the votes cast being in favor of this amendment. If this pattem
continues, we would anticipate that the observed decline in our data in the average percentage votes cast
in favor of shareholder proposals will reverse itself quite dramatically.
210. For a discussion oft-statistics and p-values, see ROBERTS PINDYCK & DANIEL L RUBINFELD,
ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC FORECASTS (1981).
211. We made this classification based on our reading of the proposal, the supporting statement of
the sponsor and any other information we had concerning the proposal.
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affect the levels of shareholder support and their impact on directors.
For example, a typical Corporate Governance executive pay proposal
might seek to bring about changes in the way the company sets pay in
order to improve corporate profitability. A Social Policy proposal might
seek to change the company's pay practices because they were claimed
to be unfair.
A total of 129 proposals (77% of the sample) are classified as
Corporate Governance and thirty-nine (23%) are considered Social
Policy proposals. The percentage of votes cast in favor of Corporate
Governance proposals (11. 7 %) is significantly greater than that cast for
Social Policy proposals (9.8%). The t-statistic for the difference in
means is 1.74 (p-value = 0.08).
C. Compensation Results
The first step in evaluating executive compensation levels is to
determine an appropriate comparison sample. Our approach is to
match each sample firm with a group of companies in the same industry
classification and of approximately the same size. We make the size
adjustment because firm size has a significant impact on executive
compensation levels. 212 As shown in Table 5, Panel A, the firms
receiving shareholder proposals tend to be very large companies with
median annual sales of more than $11 billion dollars.
In order to match the target firms with comparably-sized firms in the
same industry, we sort, for each of the sample years, all firms on
Standard & Poor's ExecuComp data base that are in the S&P 500 index
by their two-digit industry code and then sort them again by sales within
each industry. We next calculate the average value of each component
of the CEO's compensation package for the firms in the largest half of
each industry. For simplicity, hereafter, we refer to this industry and
size matched benchmark as simply the "industry average." The
difference between a sample firm's compensation component and the
industry average is called the "industry adjusted" compensation
component." 3
212. S&e Murphy, supra note 6 (summarizing empirical studies).
213. The average and median sample firm is significantly larger that its industry average both in
terms of sales and market capitalization. This result is a consequence of using firms from the largest half
of each industry for our comparison groups and the fact that the sample firms are among the largest
publicly-traded companies. However, we believe our methodology is adequate for two reasons.
First, many companies base their executive compensation levels in part on surveys of pay
practices at other firms within their industry groups because these are the firms with whom they compete
for executive talent. Our industry-based group should therefore be the most appropriate "market" for
comparison purposes. Second, we conducted sensitivity analysis on how our results would be affected by
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Table 4 presents average values of various components of the CEO's
compensation for the sample firms, the industry average, and the
industry adjusted average compensation component. Even with the
industry and size adjustment, the firms in our sample pay their CEOs
more than their industry average for all compensation components.
However, the difference is statistically significant only for Salary, with
an industry adjusted average of $83,666, and All Annual Compensation,
with an industry adjusted average of $218,172. Although Option pay,
All Long-term Compensation, and Total Compensation are all
substantially larger for sample firms' CEOs, the average industry
adjusted values of $1,407,220, $1,697,500, and $1,961,730 are not
significantly different from zero.
214
Although not reported in a table, we explore the differences in the
composition of the pay packages of target firms and the comparison
group. For the sample, All Annual Compensation comprises 52.88%
of Total Compensation, whereas the industry average is 55.14%, a
difference of 2.26%. So target firms executives receive a relatively
smaller percentage of their compensation in fixed payments.
Conversely, sample firms pay their CEO relatively more using options
and long-term sources of pay. The average ratio of Long-term
Compensation to Total Compensation is 4 3 .5 7 % for the sample and
41.12% for the industry average. However, none of these differences
are statistically significant.
D. Fim Performance Characteristics
Table 5 reports descriptive and performance statistics for the sample
firms, market and industry benchmarks, and market adjusted and
industry adjusted values. Common stock returns and EPS growth rates
are measured for the three-years and five-years prior to the year the
compensation proposal appeared in the proxy statement. Common
stock returns are adjusted for average market returns by calculating the
difference between the sample firm's return and the average return of
the firms comprising the S&P 500 index. Earnings per share growth
using a comparison group comprised of the top quarter of firms within the industry. As noted below, we
found that these differences were not significant.
214. All Annual Compensation is defined as the sum of Salary, Bonus, and Other Annual
Compensation. Option compensation is valued by Standard & Poor's analysts using the Black-Scholes
option valuation formula. All Long-term Compensation is the sum of Option pay, Long-term Incentive
Payouts, and Restricted Stock Grants. Total Compensation is the sum of All Annual Compensation, All
Long-term Compensation, and Miscellaneous Other Compensation.
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rates are similarly adjusted for the average of each sample firm's
industry based on two-digit S&P industry codes.
Sample firms significantly under-perform the average S&P 500
common stock return over the three and five years prior to the proxy
year. The three-year market-adjusted common stock return for the
entire sample is -3.27%, whereas the five-year market adjusted return
is -4.05%. This poor performance appears to be due to lower than
average EPS growth rates by sample firms, although the average
industry adjusted growth rates are not significantly different from zero.
While we cannot rule out other possibilities explaining why particular
firms are targeted for compensation proposals, these results are
consistent with the hypothesis that investors target under-performing
firms for compensation proposals and are consistent with other
empirical studies." 5
To test our hypothesis that labor shareholders make good monitors,
we also calculated similar relative pay and market returns values for the
subsample of shareholder proposals offered by labor unions. We found
that labor unions targeted firms with verypoor performance characteris-
tics and high levels of executive pay.26 We further found that the
relative pay levels are (statistically insignificantly) higher at firms
targeted by labor groups than for the remainder of the sample.217
Although these results are based on a small number of observations
(which may explain their insignificance), and therefore should not be
interpreted too strongly, they are consistent with our claim that labor
shareholders may be good monitors of executive compensation."
215. See Bizjak & Christopher, supra note 180. In their study of shareholder proposals concerning
executive compensationJohnson and Shackell find that shareholders target firms that receive negative press
coverage of their executive compensation practices. If the press focuses on companies with high executive
pay and relatively poor corporate performance, then their results would be consistent with our findings.
SeeJohnson & Shackell, supra note 63 (manuscript at 1).
216. Labor proposals are targeted at firms that show market-adjusted common stock returns (3 year)
= - 6.23%; market-adjusted common stock returns (5 year) = - 4.90%; industry adjusted growth in EPS
(3 year) = -4.39%; and industry adjusted growth in EPS (5 year) = 3.46%. Although these numbers are
more negative than those reported for the full sample in Table 5, the differences are not statistically
significant.
217. For the six companies targeted by labor groups for which we have full data, we calculated that,
in the year of the proposal, average total pay for the subsample was equal to 811,372,790, compared to the
size adjusted industry average of $7,103,870. The difference between these figures is $4,268,920.
When we computed the same statistics for all of the remaining proposals in the sample, we found
that, in the year of the proposal, average total pay was equal to $6,416,420, versus the size adjusted industry
average of $4,066,750. The gap between these numbers is $2,349,660.
Although the gap between firms receiving proposals and comparably sized firms is greater for
the labor sponsored proposals, the differences between the two groups are not statistically different.
218. We note that we cannot determine what techniques labor unions are using to target firms with
executive compensation proposals. In particular, we do not know if they are using their firm-specific
knowledge of compensation practices, or other private information, to engage in more subtle forms of
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E. Impact of Proposals on Executive Compensation
Our next area of investigation focuses on the impact that executive
compensation proposals have on CEO compensation. Our hypothesis
is that although shareholders cannot dictate the terms of executives' pay,
they can influence the board of directors' decisions on these matters.
Precatory shareholder proposals are one method by which shareholders
inform the board of their views about executive pay levels and composi-
tion. As noted in Table 2, even though none of the proposals in our
sample received enough votes for passage, some proposals did achieve
substantial support. Therefore, we seek to determine if these proposals
may have had an indirect effect on executive pay packages by influenc-
ing the board's decisions.
Table 6 presents averages for the sample and industry comparison
group as well as average industry adjusted values of compensation
components for the year after executive compensation proposals. As in
Table 4, Salary and All Annual Compensation significantly exceeded
the industry average. In contrast, however, in the year after the
proposal, Bonus pay and Total Compensation were also significantly
greater than the industry average. This result is in spite of a relative
tightening in the difference between the sample's Options pay and the
industry average.
Figure 1 illustrates how comparative compensation levels change in
the year after the receipt of a shareholder proposal. It compares the
percentage changes in each of the major compensation components for
the sample group and the industry comparison group from the year of
the shareholder proposal to the year after the proposal. The percentage
changes in Salary and Option pay are much lower for the sample group,
while Bonus pay increases are larger. On the whole, Total pay increases
are much smaller though for the sample group. Table 7 reports the
underlying data and calculations illustrated in Figure 1.
Despite the fact that industry adjusted compensation components are
significantly greater than zero, the dollar amount of the changes in
industry adjusted compensation are not significant. For example,
industry adjusted All Annual Compensation rose from $218,172 in the
year of the proposal (Table 4) to $282,249 in the year after the proposal
(Table 6). But the average increase of $64,077 is not significantly
different from zero. In contrast to All Annual Compensation, industry
targeting than simply relying on the publicly available information about past performance and prior
compensation levels.
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adjusted Option pay fell from 51,407,220 (Table 4) to $820,695 (Table
6). However, the $586,525 drop is not significantly different from zero.
The decline in industry adjusted Option pay, as well as declines from
other long term sources of pay, more than offset the increase in industry
adjusted All Annual Compensation and resulted in a decline in industry
adjusted Total Compensation from $1,961,730 (Table 4) to $1,137,600
(Table 6). Again, however, this decline is not statistically significant.
The explanation for the lack of significance for these results appears to
be that although the magnitudes of the average dollar amount of
changes are large, there is tremendous variability in dollar compensation
levels." 9
In results not shown in a table, we attempt to determine if the
proposals have affected the composition of executive pay in the year
after receipt of the proposal. Industry adjusted All Annual Compensa-
tion as a percent of Total Compensation increased for the sample firms
from -2.26% in the year of the proposal to -0.16% in the year after the
proposal. Thus, CEOs of sample firms were paid greater amounts of
cash compensation adjusted for their industry average in the year after
the compensation proposal and lower amounts of long-term compensa-
tion. In effect, target companies appear to have shifted the composition
of executive pay to more closely track that of the rest of their industry.
However, none of these results are statistically significant.
We also performed sensitivity tests on our results by making two
changes. First, we examined changes in compensation components over
the two years following the year in which the compensation proposal
appeared in the proxy statement. Second, we compared each sample
firm's compensation components with average compensation of firms in
the same size quartile and two-digit industry code.22 To avoid double
counting, we excluded from this sensitivity analysis those observations
that overlap a compensation proposal at the same firm but at an earlier
date. For example, we excluded observations for which Year +2 (the
second year following the proxy year) for a sample firm is also Year 0
(the proxy year) of a subsequent proposal at the same firm. The result
of these restrictions is to limit our sample to forty-nine observations.
In spite of these sample restrictions, the pattern of results revealed in
Table 7 is generally reinforced in the second year following the proxy
year. In addition, many of the results become statistically significant.
219. Because of the way the significance statistics are calculated, this means that the denominators
are very big and therefore the value of the statistic is reduced. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 210.
220. Contrary to the results shown in Table 5, neither the mean nor median sales for the sample firms
are significandy different from the average industry sales when based on sales quartiles. This result holds
for the year of compensation proposals as well as the two years following the proposal.
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In particular, the average change in industry adjusted salary from Year
0 to Year +2, is a statistically significant $53,079 (t = 2.29). Thus, in the
two years following a compensation proposal at the sample firms, the
CEO's salary increased, on average, by $53,079 more than it increased
at the matched sample firms. While salary increased more than the
industry average, bonus pay did not. The average change in industry
adjusted CEO bonus was -$33,670, which is not significant. However,
the average change in industry adjusted stock option compensation from
Year 0 to Year +2 was a statistically significant -$2,007,640 (t = -2.89).
Given the large change in option pay, the average change in industry
adjusted total compensation from Year 0 to Year +2, -42,710,140, is
also statistically significant (t = -3.74). Taken, together, these results
tend to confirm the hypothesis that CEO compensation is revised
significantly in the years following compensation proposals.
Finally, we try to unpack the differential effects of the shareholder
proposals on executive compensation. In Table 8, we report the results
of the estimation of six regressions that examine the cross sectional
characteristics of changes in various industry adjusted compensation
components. In these regressions, we are investigating the impact of
voting support, type of proposal, and type of sponsor on compensation
changes. The dependent variables in each, of the regressions measure
the difference in target company executives' compensation minus
industry average compensation in the year after the proposal and target
company executives' compensation minus industry average compensa-
tion in the year of the proposal. For example, CHGSAL is defined as
the change in industry adjusted salary from the year of the proposal to
the year after the proposal. In a similar manner, CHGBON,
CHGANN, CHGOPT, CHGLTC, CHGTOT denote changes in
Bonus, All Annual Compensation, Options, Long-term Compensation,
and Total Compensation, respectively.22'
The explanatory variables and their potential impact on changes in
compensation are defined as follows. FOR represents the percentage of
votes cast in favor of the proposal. If directors are responsive to the level
of shareholder support for proposals, then a greater percentage of votes
cast in favor of the proposal should lead them to reduce the spread
between the CEO's compensation and the industry average, all else
221. The actual formulas are contained in the notes to Table 8.
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equal.222 Therefore, we hypothesize that the coefficient on FOR should
be negative.
RESTRICT is a dummy variable taking on the value of one for
Restrictive type proposals and zero for Disclosure type proposals. If
Restrictive proposals have more influence on directors, they should be
associated with lower changes in industry adjusted compensation.
Therefore, the coefficient on RESTRICT should be negative.
GOV is a dummy variable, taking on a value of one if a proposal is
classified as dealing with corporate governance issues and zero if it deals
with social policy issues. Like Restrictive proposals, governance
proposals may have more influence on directors than social policy
proposals. Therefore, governance proposals should be associated with
lower industry adjusted changes in compensation and GOV should have
a negative coefficient.
INDIVIDUAL is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if the
sponsor of the proposal is an individual investor and zero if it is an
institutional investor, a labor union, or a church organization. To the
extent that individuals represent "nuisance" proposals that are ignored
by the board of directors, INDIVIDUAL should have no effect on
industry adjusted changes in compensation.223
In order to avoid double counting, the sample used in Table 8 is
based on a sub-sample that includes firms that have only one proposal
in any one year. In addition, observations are excluded if the sponsor
could not be identified or classified from the proxy materials. A total of
109 observations remain.224
The results in Table 8 generally support the first two hypotheses
discussed above. FOR has a negative coefficient in each of the
regressions. However, the relationship is statistically significant only
with respect to CHGANN, the change in industry adjusted All Annual
Compensation. Thus, we find some support for the claim that proposals
with greater support from shareholders tend to result in significantly
lower industry adjusted All Annual Compensation.
222. We should note that the shareholder vote will not be finally tabulated until the shareholder
meeting is held, which may be after the compensation committee determines what compensation to award
to executives for the following year. However, the directors will have estimates from the company's proxy
solicitors beforehand of how shareholders are going to vote on these proposals. The solicitors have
substantial experience with the different types of proposals and institutional shareholders' voting preferences
on them. They know the company's shareholder composition and therefore can provide the directors with
fairly accurate information about the shareholders' support levels before the vote is taken.
223. We lacked a sufficient number of observations on labor sponsored proposals to determine
whether labor shareholders are more effective monitors of executive compensation.
224. We do not include a control variable for firm size in the regressions because we have controlled
for size in the calculation of each dependent variable. Each compensation component is adjusted for a
benchmark based on industry and size.
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RESTRICT is significantly negatively related to CHGBON and
CHGANN. This implies that Restrictive proposals are more effective in
reducing the spread between CEO annual compensation and the
industry average than Disclose proposals.
The sponsor of the proposal also appears to affect industry adjusted
compensation. INDIVIDUAL is significantly positively related to both
CHGLTC and CHGTOT. These results indicate industry adjusted
Long-Term Compensation and, as a result, industry adjusted Total
Compensation increase after proposals sponsored by individuals. We
offer no explanation for this result.
The GOV variable is insignificant in all of the regressions. It appears
that although shareholders are more likely to vote in favor of executive
pay proposals that raise corporate governance issues, rather than social
responsibility questions, this difference has no effect on the board of
directors' decisions about executive pay.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Shareholder proposals have been viewed by many investors as an
ineffective method of influencing board decisions on the level and
composition of executive pay. Our results lead us to a cautiously more
optimistic assessment of the effectiveness of this form of shareholder
activism. We tum up -some evidence that shareholders are critically
reviewing executive compensation at companies that should be
monitored. For example, our findings that shareholders are targeting
companies that exhibit relatively high pay and low performance levels
are consistent with the claim that shareholders are seeking to remedy
abuses of the pay system. Thus, shareholders may be capable of
monitoring of executive compensation.
However, the effectiveness of shareholders in challenging executive
pay practices depends crucially on how companies' board of directors
respond to their precatory proposals, and in particular, whether the
board lowers pay levels or changes the composition of pay packages in
response to them. Our results provide some support for the proposition
that shareholder proposals affect board decisions about executive
compensation levels and composition. We find that target companies
do not increase average executive compensation levels as rapidly in the
year after receiving a shareholder proposal, so that the gap between the
pay levels at target companies and pay levels at similarly-sized firms in
their industry decreases, although the magnitude of these changes is not
statistically significant. We also find some support for our hypothesis
that higher levels of shareholder voting support for these proposals are
associated with lower levels of executive compensation at companies
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receiving proposals when compared to pay levels at similarly-sized
companies in the industry.
However, we cannot conclude that Rule 14a-8 provides shareholders
with a strong means for influencing executive compensation. 225  Our
results, and our conversations with corporate directors, lead us to
conclude that shareholder proposals are only one of a variety of factors
that compensation committees consider in setting executive pay. These
proposals are given more weight by directors when they draw a
relatively high level of support, over, say, ten percent of the vote,
because they are then viewed as a significant expression of shareholder
discontent.226 But the shareholders' expressions of discontent via these
proposals do not necessarily outweigh other concerns that directors may
have in deciding about the appropriate levels of executive pay, such as
the companies' ability to retain key employees and executives.
Taking a broader perspective, shareholders' ability to influence
corporate boards on executive compensation issues has been affected by
a variety of recent legal developments. Some of these changes have
reduced shareholders' ability to vote on the issuance of stock options.
For example, the New York Stock Exchange eliminated the requirement
for shareholder approval of all stock option plans in some circumstances.
Also, more companies are apparently seeking to avoid shareholder votes
on their stock option plans through a variety of other devices.
27
Other changes may strengthen shareholders' influence in the
boardroom, such as the SEC's recent decision to permit shareholders to
put binding bylaw amendments on the corporate ballot using Rule 1 4a-
8. On this point, we hasten to add that, despite the Oklahoma Supreme.
Court's decision in the Fleming Companies case, discussed above, there
is considerable uncertainty over how the Delaware Supreme Court will
rule on the permissibility of these proposals under Delaware law.228 To
225. We would also caution that we cannot look inside the boardroom to determine whether
shareholder proposals actually do have any impact on directors' decisions concerning executive
compensation. A number of other factors may be much more significant. For example, the widespread
use of compensation surveys as a means of setting executive pay levels and composition may lead companies
that get too far ahead ofthe curve on executive pay to lower their rates of pay increase temporarily in order
to get their numbers closer to the industry averages. This may be especially true for firms that have
experienced relatively poor performance in earlier years.
226. Although this level of support may seem low, we were informed by the directors we interviewed
that they are much more sensitive to expressions of shareholder discontent when the company is performing
poorly, as are most of the companies in our sample. Their explanation for this reaction is twofold. First,
they wanted to receive strong shareholder support for all of their actions. Second, a strong signal of
shareholder discontent might be viewed by the market as a sign of potential weakness of the company,
making it more likely to become a target of an acquisition proposal.
227. Segenera/y Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71.
228. The Delaware courts have not yet ruled on the validity of these binding bylaw amendments.
However, the Delaware Supreme Court's recent decision in Qujckbum Design Systkn, Inc. v. Mentor Graphits
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the extent that shareholder voting on stock option plans becomes less
important as a monitoring technique, and binding bylaw amendments'
future remains uncertain, Rule 14a-8's significance as a shareholders'
monitoring tool will increase. 9 Should labor shareholder groups, who
lack the direct management and board access of institutional investors,
increase their efforts to bring about changes in executive compensation
practices through the voting process, this too will augment the signifi-
cance of Rule 14a-8 as a shareholder monitoring device.
However, Rule 14a-8, and shareholder monitoring in general, is best
used to address occasional problems with executive pay practices.
Corporate boards should have the primary responsibility for designing
appropriate and reasonable compensation systems as part of their
managerial functions. How much corporate employees are paid is a
business judgment best left to those with the responsibility for, and
expertise in, making business decisions. Injecting shareholders too
directly into this process runs the risk of having them engage in
micromanaging the business."' Our corporate law has chosen to place
this power in the board's hands in most circumstances.
Shareholder monitoring is much less appealing as a remedy to the
systematic problems with the compensation system that have been
alleged by some well-known critics of executive pay.2"' Even assuming
shareholders could reach consensus on what reforms might be appropri-
ate, investors would have difficulty launching a broad'enough campaign
to implement them everywhere. Shareholders would need to identify
problems in executive pay packages, to mobilize shareholders to act on
the problems identified, and to find ways to ensure that boards listened
to them.
For shareholder monitoring to be effective even in a limited monitor-
ing role, the costs of engaging in monitoring and the barriers to
Corp., 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Del. 1998), with its strong language concerning any limitations placed on
a board of directors' authority to negotiate a possible sale of the company, has cast doubt on the legitimacy
of these bylaw amendments under Delaware law.
229. Shareholder support for these proposals will only increase significantly if the monitoring
problems discussed in section III supra can be addressed. This makes it even more important for
shareholder advocates to develop widely accepted techniques for evaluating executive pay plans that can
be applied in the widest variety of situations possible.
230. For an interesting case study of one company in which shareholders apparently did engage in
such actions with unfortunate consequences, see D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial
Incompetncz: Lasons From Anart, 74 N.C. L REV. 1037, 1119-22 (1996).
231. For example, Graef Crystal in his book, In &arch of Excess, claims that the system is out of
control. Seegenerail CRYSTAL, supra note 7. Many popular press accounts concerning executive pay raise
similar critiques. If the board is "captured" by corporate management and unable to act as hard-nosed
negotiators with corporate CEOs over their pay packages, then one answer to this problem is to reform the
director nomination and retention process. eager-allo Thomas, supra note 8.
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collective action must be low. The 1992 SEC rule changes have
certainly had this effect for Rule 14a-8 proposals. Investors also need a
way of getting boards to respond to their concerns. If the courts
continue to uphold the validity of binding bylaw amendments, share-
holders may be on the verge of gaining an extremely potent technique
for forcing changes in compensation practices.
There remains much more research to do in this area. The empirical
component of this article has only focused on one of the methods used
by shareholders to register their disapproval of high levels of executive
pay. Several other important methods exist for shareholders seeking to
bring about changes in the area of executive compensation. Shareholder
opposition to highly dilutive stock option plans has become increasingly
strong in recent years.232 Binding bylaw amendments permit share-
holders to vote directly to limit certain methods of compensating
executives, such as option repricing. We believe that these are promis-
ing avenues for shareholder monitoring that deserve further attention
from academics.
232. In other work that we have just begun, we intend to extend this research to examine how
shareholder voting on company stock option plans may affect the use of stock options as a component of
executive compensation.
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Table 1
Description of Types of Executive Compensation Proposals
Proposal type Description
Report Seeks to require firm to appoint a committee of outside
directors to review executive compensation practices and
report the results to shareholders at the next annual
meetin 33
Disclose Seeks to require firm to specifically identify all individuals
within the firm whose base salary exceeds a specified
level, such as $100,000, together with any other cash
compensation paid to them.
2
34
Approve Seeks shareholder approval for bonuses to executives that
exceed a specified level, such as $30,000.23
Cap Requests the Board of Directors to establish a policy
whereby no executive receives more than a specified level
of compensation, such as $1 million, unless the
compensation is in accordance with a shareholder-
approved performance-based plan.2s
Link Requests the compensation of executive officers be tied
explicitly to changes in the firm's stock price.3 7
Reduce Seeks the discontinuance of the use of options or stock
appreciation rights in the compensation packages of
executive officers.2
Restrict Seeks to limit the total annual compensation of the top
executives in a firm to a pre-specified multiple of a
national median wage paid full-time employees. 3 9
233. See, for example, Exxon Corporation's DEFI4A Proxy Statement, 4/30/97, p. 22.
234. See, for example, United Technologies Corporation's DEFI4A Proxy Statement, 4/29/97, p.






See, for example, PepsiCo Inc.'s DEFI4A Proxy Statement, 5/7/97, p. 16.
See, for example, BellSouth Corporation's DEF14A Proxy Statement, 4/28/97, p. 14.
See, for example, Merck & Co., Inc.'s DEFI4A Proxy Statement, 4/23/97, p. 21.
See, for example, Lockheed Martin Corporation's DEFI4A Proxy Statement, 4/24/97, p. 26.
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Table 7
Average Dollar Change in CEO Compensation Components
from Year of to Year after Executive Compensation Proposal
(Percentage Change in Averages in Parentheses below Dollar Change)
All Firms (N= 145)
Change in Change in
Change in Size-Matched Difference between
Sample Industry Sample Average and
Average Average Industry Averagea
Salary $43,970 $26,665 $17,305
(4.85%) (3.24%)
Bonus $234,929 $162,355 $72,574
(23.66%) (18.21%)
All Annual $263,034 $198,957 $64,077
Compensation' (13.13/o) (11.15/o)
Optionsc $-95,394 $491,133 $-586,527
(-3.15%) (30.240/6)
All Long-Term
Compensationd $-171,997 $603,653 $-775,650
(-4.26%) (25.81%)
Miscellaneous Other
Compensation $34,272 $146,829 $-112,557
(18.540/) (105.810/6)
Total
Compensatione $125,309 $949,439 $-824,130
(2.01%) (22.27%)
***, **, * Paired t-test indicates significant difference from zero at the .01, .05, and .10 level,
respectively.
a For each sample firm, each compensation component is compared to the average component
for the largest half (based on sales) of the companies in the sample firm's industry (based on the 2-digit S&P
industry code).
b All Annual Compensation is defined as the sum of Salary, Bonus, and Other Annual
Compensation.
c Options are the Black-Scholes value of stock options granted.
d All Long-Term Compensation is defined as the sum of options valued using the Black-Scholes
model according to S&P Ew=mom, long-term incentive payouts, and the value of restricted shares granted.
e Total compensation is the sum of All Annual Compensation, All Long-Term Compensation,
and Miscellaneous Other Compensation.
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